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THE FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE
UNITED STATES

BY

FELIX MORLEY

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
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The Foreign Policy of the United States (1951)

FELIX MORLEY




The Foreign Policy
OF THE
UNITED STATES




NEW YORK
ALFRED · A · KNOPF

1952

L. C. CATALOGUE CARD NUMBER: 51-12070




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


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*Published November 12, 1951
Second printing, January 1952*



INTRODUCTION



This book developed from the manuscript of three talks, on "The Foreign Policy of the United States," given by the author at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, under the Cornelius R. Berrien Lectureship, February 21-23, 1951.

With some revision and addition these lectures were printed, under the same title, in March, 1951, as one of the pamphlet series of the American Enterprise Association. The published studies of this educational and non-partisan body "are intended to place in perspective, and to analyze, matters of major importance that either are the subject of pending legislation or seem likely to become so in the near future."

The interest evoked by a somewhat unconventional treatment of the subject of foreign policy, both among college students and in the wider audience reached by the pamphlet, encouraged the further development of the material into its present form. While the pamphlet presentation has been expanded throughout, and four wholly new chapters added, effort has been made to preserve the conciseness and simplicity of the original informal lectures.

The entire presentation is based upon two connected educational convictions applied by the author while

president and William Penn professor of government at Haverford College, 1940-1945. These convictions grew out of years of reportorial and editorial work in the field of international relations; were given laboratory tests in college seminars and in conversations with both academic and practical politicians; have received a stimulating reception which is largely responsible for the arrangement of this book.

It is the author's assumption, *first* that the subject of foreign policy actually has a scientific content, and that the inherent and enduring nature of foreign policy as such should therefore be impartially examined prior to any survey of hit-or-miss techniques adopted by any particular government at any particular time. Much fun has been poked at the Russian Communists for insisting that subjects like art and biology be compressed within the framework of Soviet ideology. It would seem that any attempt to examine American foreign policy without reference to the contributions of other governments, antedating our own, is equally malformed and restrictive.

The author's *second* and correlative conviction on this subject is that the whole theory of "bipartisan foreign policy", so widely advertised and promoted in recent years, is utterly fallacious, injurious to economy and efficiency, contrary to every basic principle of the American form of government, and directly responsible for all of our major blunders in the foreign policy field.

Of course in attacking the theory of bipartisanism, no partisan viewpoint is implied. The reasoning in this matter is equally valid whichever party is in power, and whichever one in opposition.

The American political system assumes, on the basis of overwhelming confirmatory historical and psychological evidence, that the concentration of power always tends towards the abuse of power, and that concentrated power most easily becomes arbitrary when criticism is suppressed.

Therefore, in the interest of the people as a whole, this Federal Republic maintains its Constitutional system of checks and balances, and in the Bill of Rights specifies the freedom of the citizen to criticize his government, within such bounds as good manners, and if need be the courts, determine to be appropriate.

Two-party organization, based respectively on support and on criticism of the administration provisionally in power, is the natural and indeed inevitable result of this political theory. And any attempt to muffle or suppress the critical judgment of the opposition party must be regarded as contrary to the spirit of the American Constitution. Since the President is the official head of the party in power, and is also the official ultimately responsible to the sovereign people in the field of foreign policy, the opposition cannot indorse "bipartisanism" in this field without betraying its vital political duty. Why condemn the one-party system of Soviet Russia if we seek to imitate it ourselves?

The saying that "politics stops at the water's edge" had validity as long as, but only as long as, policies also stopped at the water's edge. As policies became more and more international it also became not merely appropriate but imperative that foreign policy should be a partisan issue. To say otherwise is tantamount to saying that

democratic procedures are reasonable when it is a matter of choosing the village dogcatcher, but that autocracy is preferable when the issue is that of life or death.

Still another defect in the bipartisan attitude is that it tends to conceal the very large area of reasoned agreement on foreign policy that has always existed, and exists today, in the United States. This book endeavors to clarify and define that area.

Of course the people as a whole should be expected to rally behind any administration that has entered a war by constitutional methods, and at all times criticism of a purely captious, obstructive or negative nature should be discouraged. To admit this freely is far from saying that thoughtful, well-informed and dispassionate criticism of foreign policy should be abandoned by the people and their elected representatives in Congress. The advocates of bipartisanship, however, for a time went so far as to suggest that almost any adverse comment on Administration foreign policy was downright unpatriotic.

In the belief of the author this attitude is basically responsible for the grave errors which, by general admission, characterized the conduct of our foreign policy immediately after the Second World War. The suppression of the critical faculty, moreover, is hostile to any development of foreign policy in line with principles holding more promise than mere political opportunism for world peace.

Although these beliefs will seem to some what the Politburo would call "deviationist" they were not lightly reached, and are supported in the following pages by a substantial body of evidence.

Grateful acknowledgment is made by the author to the suggestions and advice of many friends who are presently, or were formerly, in the diplomatic service of the United States and other governments; to Pierre F. Goodrich and Joseph M. Lalley for helpful criticism; to Evelyn L. Freer, who assumed the burden of preparation. Appreciation for permission to utilize material originally prepared for their purposes is also due, and thankfully given, to President Victor L. Butterfield of Wesleyan University, to the officers of the American Enterprise Association and to Editor John Davenport of *Barron's Weekly*. None of these, of course, has any responsibility for the argument or conclusions of this essay in particular or as a whole.

August, 1951.

FELIX MORLEY



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THE FOREIGN POLICY
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UNITED STATES

"If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it."

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *A House Divided*,
Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858

The Nature of Foreign Policy

THOUGH HIS INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS MAY BE SEVERELY limited, the average American likes to be informed on what does concern him. He knows, for instance, why the fielders shift position when a left-handed batter steps to the plate. He usually understands the principles underlying radio and television. He has some idea of what is wrong when the family car refuses to operate. His folk heroes are those who have been most adept in the practical application of theoretical knowledge—the Bells, Edisons, Fords, McCormicks and Wrights.

This ability to see the implications of a principle, in work or play, is well defined as “know-how”. It was, until fairly recently, apparent in our politics, as in every other national activity. During the past twenty years, however, the ancient European practice of glamorizing government has steadily encroached upon the national critical faculty in politics. As a result comprehension is dulled, mistakes of leadership go undetected and a sense of frustration has gradually overcome a people who were once both schooled and skilled in self-government.

When there was general understanding of the principle of checks and balance, no Chief Executive ever presumptuously defined a Congress as “good” or “bad” according to the degree of its subservience to him. When

the nature of the Federal Republic was still appreciated, no Senator who opposed extension of centralized power could be termed "reactionary" for that reason alone.

The present uncritical attitude towards political problems has kept many people from realizing the magnitude of the change already effected in our institutions. Those who urge the progressive intervention of government in business were once accurately and dispassionately known as "Socialists". But most American Socialists now describe themselves as "liberals", although that designation for a believer in State planning is directly opposite to the historic meaning of the word. There is no doubt that this type of semantic duplicity, or double-talk, has been politically influential.

There is equally little doubt that much of the confusion in our political thought today stems from this conflict between the citizen's natural desire to understand governmental problems and the alien idea that people are not really citizens, but subjects whose whole duty is to do what the State commands. If the latter theory continues to triumph there will be no room, in any field of endeavor, for the questioning attitude that is basic to American "know-how". The lingering faith in the value of freedom of expression is not enough. Some comprehension of what has been happening is also essential.

While confusion of thought is now pronounced in every sphere of politics, it is particularly obvious, and especially dangerous, in that area of politics called foreign policy. This has become the area of greatest domestic political tension, in which the gap between official

direction and wholehearted public acceptance is now so wide that reconciliation has become imperative.

There are of course many reasons for the widening of this chasm between the thinking of those who lead and of those who must follow in the field of foreign policy. Its problems are, by nature, remote from the experience of the average citizen. Though habitually well-informed about their own communities, most Americans seldom even pretend to know anything about Inner Mongolia, Upper Silesia or the Outer Hebrides. There is much more curiosity than xenophobia in the national attitude towards that which is foreign. But intellectual curiosity is seldom satisfied by the so-called "experts", generally more inclined to expound than to explain.

Factors other than the plethora of inconsequential details tend to make a mystery of foreign policy, and to conceal the shape of the wood behind the foliage of countless trees. In the absence of comprehensible analysis and effective criticism, the necessarily monopolistic conduct of foreign policy can easily become a vested interest. Its practitioners tend to assume the prerogatives of a close-knit priesthood, too readily identifying their conclusions with the general welfare. The validity of that assumption, however, becomes more questionable as the number of tax dollars spent on foreign policy mounts to astronomical figures.

Actually, the foreign policy of a government is neither a gigantic bluff, developed to swindle the taxpayer, nor is it an esoteric art requiring both a special intelligence and a special wardrobe. There are certain fundamental factors common to the diplomacy of every sovereign

power, regardless of its time in history or its place in geography. There are also certain special factors, such as its type of government, or its dependence on a flow of imports, that must affect the foreign policy of any single nation continuously. Finally, there is the political objective of any particular regime at any particular time, which can be ascertained much more clearly from the actions of its leaders than from their words.

Of the importance of foreign policy to the American people there is no longer any question. During the first half of the present century the relations of the United States with other sovereignties rapidly attained a primary importance. The manner in which our foreign policy is planned and directed has now become literally a matter of life or death, to every American family.

It is therefore timely and appropriate to approach the subject of American foreign policy in an American way, by attempting to show, as simply and directly as possible, what it is all about. This effort will require some consideration of political principles and more than passing reference to historical background. It will also demand forthright consideration of contemporary events. Those who merely theorize disregard practice. Those who merely describe practice overlook the importance of theory.

The triumph of American know-how has been in its characteristic ability to blend and combine the two.

2.

IN SPITE OF THE LONG EFFORT to establish international law, and two great co-operative attempts to make it effective through international organization, the control of human destiny, politically speaking, is still divided among many more or less independent governments. Their relationships, one to another, may at any given moment be amicable, antagonistic, or indifferent. But they are never static.

Foreign policy is the governmental conduct of the relations of one political sovereignty with others. It is an art, in the sense that this policy is always affected by emotional, sometimes even by wholly irrational, considerations. But foreign policy is also a science, in the sense that predictable results follow from predisposing causes. Those results may be wholly unforeseen by the great mass of mankind and wholly unwelcome to them as individuals. The event that human action has made inevitable, however, is indifferent alike to the regrets and to the recriminations of men.

Sovereign states are always potentially rival or contending states. None should appreciate that truism better than Americans, from their own domestic history. Our Civil War, still known in the South as "the war between the states", was possible only because of the large degree of sovereignty retained by these quasi-independent Commonwealths when the original Constitution established "a more perfect", but still imperfect, union.

Rivalry and contention among sovereignties not subject to a common law can always lead to war, which is the final arbitrament of disputes between independent governments. The potential extent of conflict is determined by the number of sovereignties. It is readily ascertainable from the formula: $x = \frac{n(n-1)}{2}$, in which "n" represents the number of sovereign governments and "x" the number of wars which could theoretically be waged by all of them at any given time.

The application of this formula is startling. It shows that if the 48 states of our Federal Union were free to fight each other, no fewer than 1128 internecine wars could be raging simultaneously within the confines of our continental boundaries. If Alaska and Hawaii were also possessed of full sovereign statehood, the number of wars theoretically possible within these disunited states would jump to 1225.

The *Statesman's Year Book* currently lists 70 separate sovereignties, even when Australia, Canada, Eire, New Zealand and South Africa are regarded as dependencies within the British Commonwealth. Applying the formula to these 70 nations, we learn that a maximum of 2415 wars could be carried on simultaneously in the world as politically organized today. As such absolute anarchy is highly improbable, even though theoretically possible, it can at least be said that the actual political condition of a world of contending states is better than it might be.

The unlikely number of possible wars is of course reached only by assuming such seemingly fantastic conflicts as Hungary vs. Haiti; Uruguay vs. Luxemburg;

Lebanon vs. Thailand. Yet one remembers that only recently the United States was at war with Romania, and Nicaragua with Germany. As distance is cut down by improved communications, and as parochial happenings tend to have a more universal effect, the probability of disputes between any two or more sovereignties increases. This tendency is not lessened by the domination of rival Great Powers over smaller sovereignties of satellite status. Unhappily it is no longer preposterous to visualize Hungarians at war with Haitians, if the foreign policy of the former is under Russian, of the latter under American, direction.

The impact of modern invention has made proximity a relative matter and the record of history indicates that neighboring sovereignties have always been prone to resort to war. A distinguished archaeologist tells us that: "Almost the oldest legible documents . . . describe wars between the adjacent cities of Lagash and Umma [in Mesopotamia] for the possession of a strip of frontier territory."¹

Belligerency was certainly endemic among the city-states of ancient Greece. Epidaurus and Troezen, in the Peloponnesus, were only fourteen miles apart. We know that they fought each other, with periods of recuperative tranquility, for more than seven centuries. There was no enduring peace in this region until the Romans took over both the rival towns, in 146 B.C. Contemporary evidence shows a similar record of almost constant conflict between Plataea and Thebes, and other Greek

¹ V. Gordon Childe: *What Happened in History* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books; 1948), p. 100.

neighbors less far apart, and less well-known, than the two classic antagonists: Athens and Sparta.²

Conventional European history is indeed largely a gloomy compilation of the continuous and kaleidoscopic conflicts of city-states, ancient empires, feudal baronies and modern nations. This continuous belligerency has been so pronounced as to lead some European scholars to maintain that history is only the record of the relations between independent sovereignties. Spengler asserts flatly that: "domestic politics exist simply in order that foreign politics may be possible."³

Americans, proud of the domestic political experimentation that produced this Republic, are loath to accept so sweeping an interpretation. Nevertheless, it cannot be lightly dismissed. American domestic history, from the establishment of independence to the end of the Civil War, is very largely the story of not always amicable relations between quasi-independent states. After the issue of secession was decided the stronger Federal sovereignty moved very quickly, as the historian measures time, into its present commanding but exposed position on the international stage.

² Cf. Edward Lucas White: *Why Rome Fell* (New York: Harper & Brothers; 1927), Ch. 3.

³ Oswald Spengler: *The Decline of the West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1928), Vol. II, p. 398.

3.

OUR FIRST STEP is to understand the theory of foreign policy as it really is, rather than as a particular government wishes its application of that theory to be visualized.

The unemotional objectivity necessary for this task is attainable in examining the relationships of Athens and Sparta; or of Carthage and Rome. It is not so easy in the case of the Crusades, where religious prejudice still enters, despite the passage of hundreds of years. The fighting between England and Spain in the Sixteenth Century, two centuries before the idea of the United States took form, receives differing interpretations from Catholic and Protestant historians. And it is utterly futile to expect a detached attitude, in either country, concerning the present bitter antagonism between the United States and Soviet Russia.

Much as a family, divided within itself, unites to resist external pressures, so—only far more so—a nation unites to defend itself against any foreign impingement. This is not merely a matter of supporting that which is familiar against the influence of that which is strange, and therefore subject to mistrust. The whole weight and power of government is also exercised, and increasingly exercised, to keep its supporters from being impartial in any serious international dispute.

This governmental characteristic is common to both democratic and totalitarian states. Indeed in the former, where freedom of expression is generally permitted, the

effort to make the official viewpoint dominant is likely to be even more intensive than in the case of a dictatorship, which can assume that few will dare to question the prevalent party line. Under representative government there is more social, and under a dictatorship more political, pressure to conform. But in both cases the pressures must be injurious, and can be fatal, to the scientific spirit.

This situation makes it essential that any candid examination of the nature of foreign policy be detached from national bias. It must concentrate on *Das Ding an sich*—the thing itself. Then, after the basic characteristics of foreign policy are understood, it is appropriate and helpful to apply the critical faculty to the manifestations of a particular case.

When a doctor diagnoses, and when a surgeon operates, they free themselves from personal prejudice towards the object of their ministrations. It is the ailment that the doctor seeks to locate, or the tumor that the surgeon seeks to excise, regardless of whether the patient is a friend or stranger. Indeed, simply to safeguard that professional objectivity, there is a generally accepted convention restraining the physician from treating those near and dear to him.

The record strongly indicates that some malignant force has always operated in the relations of all sovereign governments with each other, wholly regardless of their form and structure. If that malignancy is to be detected, as a step towards cure, the approach to the problem must be as detached and scientific as is that of the medical profession. In that spirit we proceed.

The Effort for Security

CONFRONTED WITH THE GREAT MULTIPLICITY OF POSSIBLE wars the endeavor of foreign policy, even during the primitive stage of the development of sovereign states, has always been twofold.

There has been the effort to provide security within the possible area of conflict and the effort to reduce that area. Both attempts indicate that organized society has from its beginning regarded war as inimical to human happiness and progress. The two endeavors have long proceeded side by side, with reciprocal effects one upon the other. But since the effort to achieve security is the more instinctive, it should be considered first.

Organization for group security is a practice as ancient as the earliest forms of social organization. From the outset this organization seems to have been for offensive as well as defensive purposes, although Neanderthal men doubtless reasoned in a dim way that they committed aggression to make their own caves more secure. No folk belief is older than the saying that the best defense is an offense and Christianity has not successfully undermined the strength of that proverb. There is absolutely no historical or scientific basis for the assumption that the group to which one belongs is ipso facto defensive, the foreign group as naturally offensive. However, there has

long been a certain rhythm in the two kinds of warfare. It follows the reciprocal development of offensive and defensive weapons: from the sword and the shield to the air-borne bomb and the subterranean factory.

When the State, as we know it today, began to develop, it gradually organized professional fighters to insure its security, whether by attack or defense. The writings of Julius Caesar, to go no further back, show us that the Roman soldier was trained for both types of warfare. Where there is any difference of emphasis, in the oldest military manuals available, it consistently favors offensive warfare, as that best calculated to subdue the enemy and achieve victory. The very word "victory", incidentally, in our own and other languages has a significantly negative meaning—"defeat of an enemy"—rather than one of positive, universally helpful accomplishment.

Foreign policy, as the official plan for the relations of one sovereignty to others, grew up side by side with the professional army, an institution that from the beginning has been a potent tool of diplomacy, which is the procedure by which the foreign policy plan is made operative.

Indeed it may be asserted that a sovereignty can have no policy, other than submission, towards other sovereignties unless it has military force, directly or indirectly available, at its command. Apparent exceptions, like that of Western Germany or Japan during the years immediately following World War II, invite a close inspection. In this period neither Bonn nor Tokyo possessed full sovereignty. So far as either had the semblance of a foreign policy, it was based on military potential or

on the backing of the armies of occupation, or on both.

Though indispensable to foreign policy, the military force is nevertheless only the agent of that policy. Even if the Chief of State is a general, and a dictator, he must utilize professional diplomats, as Napoleon employed Talleyrand, to direct the external relations of the government. That is partly because no army is organized to run a national economy—"bayonets won't dig coal", as the French found when they occupied the Ruhr in 1923; partly because no government can afford to be continuously at war. There must be periods—long periods—for economic recuperation and during these times of peace all negotiations with other sovereignties are diplomatic, with the military in reserve to give the diplomatic presentation more force.

Between the approach of the civilian diplomat and that of the military commander there has always been one striking difference. The diplomat maintains the polite fiction that he uses only defensive methods to develop national security. Even the diplomats of Soviet Russia assert that their government has no aggressive design, though they have discarded most of the other conventions which used to make the conduct of foreign policy a polished and gentlemanly profession.

Unlike the diplomat, the professional soldier has never pretended to regard foreign policy as being purely or even primarily defensive in nature. And for this difference there is an important reason, which explains the traditional diplomatic leaning towards deception.

2.

WHETHER SUCCESSFUL or unsuccessful, the conduct of foreign policy is costly. The actual upkeep of the foreign office, known as the Department of State with us, is only a trifling part of the expenditure involved.

The military establishment, providing the latent force that makes diplomacy effective, has for centuries consumed a large part of the budget of nearly every sovereign state. In addition, foreign policy throughout the ages has often required huge subsidies to other governments, to buy their good will or to strengthen them as allies. Peacetime espionage and intelligence work are among other items often overlooked in estimating the cost of foreign policy, as the amount of this expenditure is always kept secret and either excluded from or concealed in whatever accounting the government makes public.

Since all this expenditure must be paid for by the people, in one form or another, the taxpayers as a whole are at least dimly aware that the cost of their government's foreign policy bears down on them. In consequence every government must justify its activities in this field to the subjects who foot the bill. As a practical matter, no ruler of a state can afford to admit that his policy is aggressive and calculated to bring war, even when a candid survey of the facts permits no other conclusion.

This necessity of deceiving the people, especially in

matters of foreign policy, is indeed an accepted principle of statesmanship. Machiavelli, writing *The Prince* in 1513, devoted all of his eighteenth chapter to it, under the title: "In What Way Princes Must Keep Faith." The conclusion of this great political scientist was that a Chief of State must always "seem to be all mercy, faith, integrity, humanity and religion." However:

"... those that have been best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But it is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be a great feigner and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so ready to obey present necessities, that one who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived." ¹

When the strategy of foreign policy is successful, with or without a victorious war, the fact of deception, if realized at all, is generally overlooked by the "simple" subjects. But when foreign policy is obviously unsuccessful the tempo of deception must be increased and the blame for failure must, if possible, be focussed outside the entourage of "The Prince".

The classical way to accomplish this end is to inflame popular prejudice against a rival government or system. Machiavelli cites several instances of how this was successfully accomplished, notably by King Ferdinand of Spain, who got out of domestic difficulties by successively attacking Morocco, Italy and France, "so that he has continually contrived great things which have kept his subjects' minds uncertain and astonished, and occupied in watching their result." ²

¹ Niccolò Machiavelli: *The Prince* (New York: Modern Library; 1940), pp. 64-65.

² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

3.

THE TRADITIONAL METHODS used to achieve national security are aggrandizement and alliances. Aggrandizement has generally taken the form of outright conquest, either of contiguous or distant territory. Alliances, directed against another state or group of states, are always called "defensive" because that characterization is soothing to the taxpayers. Actually, they are more often defensive than offensive in purpose, but can generally be utilized either way. In publishing the terms of an alliance the contracting parties customarily omit any clauses providing for offensive action.

The great majority of states that exist today have at one time or another consciously directed their foreign policy to the conquest of additional territory, containing both economic and human resources. The form of that conquest has varied, in accordance with the geographical problems of the aggressor state.

Thus Great Britain and Japan, being insular countries, were alike compelled to direct their conquests overseas. Russia and the United States were able to expand more naturally by annexation of land and peoples directly bordering their original areas.

Aggression was not less real in the two last cases, but could be more readily exculpated than in the case of conquests requiring the use of navies. Annexations from Mexico by the United States, from Turkey by Russia, seemed less "imperial" than the taking of Ceylon by

Britain, or Formosa by Japan. Self-defense could not be convincingly employed as a reason in the latter instances. Nevertheless, national historians generally manage to give the fact of conquest a pleasant gloss. In the case of Ceylon, Professor C. Grant Robertson, of Oxford University, observes casually that it "fell into our hands".³ It is not impossible that some future Russian historian will use the same euphemistic wording in regard to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Alliances, as a device of foreign policy, are also as old as recorded history, though more unfamiliar than wars of aggrandizement to most Americans because, until recently, it was a cardinal point of our policy to regard the former as dangerously "entangling".

The story of the Peloponnesian War, so graphically told by Thucydides, is on the diplomatic side very largely an account of the shifting alliances formed by Athens and Sparta. From the account of this impartial historian, though plenty of other evidence on the subject is available, we may also realize how difficult it is for a weak state to maintain neutrality in an area where the alliance system operates.

In 420 B.C. the Athenians sent a diplomatic mission to the little island of Melos, which up to that time had managed to preserve an uneasy neutrality between the two Great Powers of their time and place. The Melians, feeling the military pressure applied by Athens, said to these envoys: "We see you are come to be judges in your own cause". To which the Athenians replied, in

³ Charles Grant Robertson: *England Under the Hanoverians* (London: Methuen & Co.; 1919), p. 380.

language very similar to that of modern statesmanship:

“You will not think it dishonorable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse.” ⁴

Like other small states, in much later world wars, Melos nevertheless chose to defend its neutrality, and as a result was overwhelmed by Athens. In modern times Switzerland, and to a lesser extent Spain and Sweden, have more successfully upheld the doctrine of neutrality as opposed to alliances. The Swiss refusal to join the United Nations is due to the alliance characteristics of this international organization.

Although foreign policy has always laid great stress on building alliances their historic result has been not to prevent war, but rather to enlarge its eventual scope as the inevitable counteralliances are developed. Recognition of this lesson of history, at a time when the United States also favored neutrality as the basis of foreign policy, led George Washington to warn, in the Farewell Address, that:

“The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little *political* connection as possible.”

⁴ Thucydides: *Complete Writings* (New York: Modern Library; 1934), pp. 335-6.

4.

THE FORMULA $x = \frac{n(n-1)}{2}$ is useful not merely to tell us how many wars are possible at a given moment, but also to indicate methods by which the number of potential wars may be reduced. As "n"—representing the number of independent sovereignties—becomes smaller, so also does "x"—the number of theoretically possible conflicts between these sovereignties.

If "n" is reduced to one—meaning only one political sovereignty on earth, then $x = 0$. This expresses the obvious fact that under an effective world government there could be no international war, though of course there might be civil war between states united in a global federal union. The formula is directly applicable only to wars between actual sovereignties. It summarizes the theoretical case for world government, but of course offers no assurance that this panacea would actually maintain peace.

However, it should be noted that, since our own Civil War, repetition of this American tragedy has been rendered unlikely by reducing the sovereign power of the states, and vesting powers taken from them in the Federal Government. So far as the power to make war is concerned, it is agreed that only one sovereignty in the United States—that concentrated in Washington—now possesses it. Therefore, within our union, $x = \frac{0}{2}$ or zero

and no war between Maine and California, or even between such adjacent commonwealths as Pennsylvania and Maryland, need be anticipated.

Much of the same motive of unification lies behind the perennial effort of foreign policy to achieve national security by aggrandizement and alliances. If one sovereign power conquers and takes control over another, the value of "n" in the formula is thereby reduced by one and the number of potential wars is correspondingly diminished. By the same token, the doctrine of self-determination tends to *increase* the number of potential sovereignties and thereby increases the number of possible wars, in geometrical progression.

To put it concretely, Egypt and Palestine could not war with each other when both were under British domination. As wholly independent sovereignties, Egypt and Israel can make war, not merely with each other but at least theoretically with every other nation. The same is true of India and Pakistan. Conversely, Bulgaria and Rumania, or Poland and Lithuania, were much more likely to fight each other as independent sovereignties than they are now as Soviet satellites, all controlled from Moscow.

Thus we reach the conclusion, whether or not morally objectionable, that the policy of conquest has undoubtedly served to save the world from a number of wars.

Similarly, the alliance system has served to lessen the likelihood of wars between the allies. This arrangement qualifies the sovereignty of each state in the alliance, at least to the extent of an agreement not to make war upon other members of the alliance. The value of "n" in the formula is thus in fact, if not theoretically, reduced.

But this contraction of sovereignty is always temporary and often ineffective, as shown by the historic tendency of allies to fall out as soon as the external threat that prompted the alliance is removed.

Nevertheless, both aggrandizement and alliances are foreign policy techniques which, on balance, are seen to have reduced the number of war-making sovereignties and thereby also have reduced the number, though not the scope, of potential wars.



III

The Balance of Power



BY THE HISTORIC DEVICES OF TERRITORIAL CONQUEST AND military alliances, foreign policy has long operated so as to reduce the number of petty conflicts between small states. But simultaneously there has been an increase in the intensity and destructiveness of such wars as have occurred.

The progress of science, bringing an enormous development in the lethal quality of weapons, is of course the obvious reason why war has become so much more destructive. But it is not the only, nor indeed the underlying, reason.

Wars become more destructive, independent of the character of weapons, as the sovereigns arrayed against each other become more powerful and more determined to eliminate a deadly rival. This tendency, rendered far more frightful by the application of scientific knowledge to warfare, is one with which foreign policy has not yet learned how to deal. No reliable solution has been found by following the theory of collective action against an aggressor state.

As we shall see in subsequent chapters, neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations squarely faced the problem of restraining a powerful aggressor. The organic law of both these world organizations opti-

mistically anticipated that the "Great Powers", to which special constitutional privileges were given, would never be aggressors. It was assumed, with very little historical justification, that wars are customarily started by weak nations, and that the more powerful "peace-loving" nations are then reluctantly drawn in.

Therefore, both the League and U.N. concentrated on procedures whereby a few powerful nations could combine to repress disturbances between small states. Neither organization was constituted to confront the flouting of its will by a Great Power, as Japan in the case of the League and Russia in the case of U.N.

World War I of course did have as its proximate cause aggressive action emanating from a small state. The "overt act" was the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by two Serb nationalists, on June 28, 1914. The consequent Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia then led in rapid sequence to the Russian mobilization against Austria, to the German ultimatum to Russia, and then to war between the Dual Alliance, of Germany and Austria, and the Triple Entente of Russia, France and Great Britain.

It is now generally realized, however, that the underlying cause of World War I was not Serbian nationalism, but the deep-rooted rivalry between Germany and Russia in which little Serbia—no longer even existent—merely played the role of pawn. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 was supported by Germany and would probably have been followed in 1914 by seizure of Serbia itself, had Russia not intervened in behalf of its small Slavic protégé. The Czar did

intervene, because he was certain of French support, under existing alliances, if Germany supported Austria against Russia, as Germany was pledged to do.

World War I came because Europe had been polarized into two camps, creating an explosive situation in which the assassination at Sarajevo was shocking enough to cause detonation. Many volumes have been written to prove, and to deny, that the megalomania of Kaiser Wilhelm, the Balkan intrigues of Czarist Russia, and other important secondary factors, led to war in 1914. Whatever the measure of truth in each and all of these conflicting contentions, it is reasonable to assert that the polarization of Europe really made the disastrous conflict inevitable.

The European alliance system reached a dead-end when it had divided most of that continent into two evenly-balanced hostile camps. The device of annexation ceased to reduce, and instead served to precipitate, conflict after the alliance system made attempts at annexation a *casus belli*. Foreign policy then had no alternative to war, the more so because the English method of balance-of-power had lost its efficacy. This method, because of its ingenuity and long success, will be examined in this chapter. But it is necessary to consider first the tendency towards political polarization, so pronounced today, and so prevalent throughout history, that one is inclined to regard it as a law of politics.

2.

CERTAINLY the tendency towards polarization—leading to a culminating conflict between two Great Powers—was as operative in the ancient world as it is now. In spite of the additional intensity provided by hostile economic and moral viewpoints there is nothing essentially novel or unprecedented in the antagonism between the United States and Soviet Russia. History shows other pairs of supreme rivals contesting for supremacy throughout the area open to their respective foreign policies.

In the Fifth Century B.C., Western civilization was concentrated at the far end of the Mediterranean Sea. This area was successfully defended by the Greeks against the Persians and other Eastern peoples with a lower cultural development. But the genius of Athens proved unable to solve the problems of foreign policy. It drifted into what proved to be a suicidal war with Sparta.

When Athens and Sparta both went under, together with all their allies, Rome and Carthage replaced them as protagonists on a larger stage, including the entire Mediterranean Basin. The tendency towards polarization continued to operate. Each of the giants of that day sought by aggrandizement and alliances to develop its strength for a showdown with the other.

The fight *à l'outrance* came in the three Punic Wars, which raged, with uneasy intervals of peace, from 264

to 202 B.C. "*Carthago delenda est*", said Cato at the close of every speech he made in the Roman Senate. Finally Carthage *was* utterly destroyed as a sovereign power and Rome went on to other conquests.

But all historians seem to agree that the fiber of Rome was weakened, and the seeds of its eventual downfall planted, by the overstrain, and consequent social and political demoralization, of the Punic Wars. The institutions that had served Rome well as a city-state were neither suited, nor were they ever adequately developed, to support the imperial role with permanent success.

Thoughtful students of foreign policy have long brooded over these two essentially similar catastrophes. They provide substantial evidence that the certain consequence of political consolidation, by conquest and alliance, is to produce two supreme rivals within the area in which rivalry can be effectively exercised. Common sense alone would tell us that if one Great Power feels it necessary to build its strength against the other, the latter will react in like manner. The area of neutrality diminishes as that of antagonism expands. Finally the ultimate showdown becomes inevitable.

It is further strongly indicated, if not proven, that when polarization is followed by explosion, the sovereign that appears to conquer is as definitely doomed as the sovereign that is vanquished.

3.

AFTER the exhausted quiescence of the dark ages, states that still exist as world powers began to emerge and acquire national in place of feudal form.

Of all these European people the English have proved politically the most successful, not merely in the generally peaceful ordering of their domestic affairs, but even more so in a foreign policy that enabled a small island, with few natural resources, to spread its influence, prestige and governing skill around the globe.

That the English success was due in very large measure to the doctrine of the Balance of Power is unquestionable. To this simple yet brilliant theory of foreign policy, more than to any other single factor, the British Empire owes the long duration and the great success of its supremacy.

The doctrine of the Balance of Power is simple because it is based on an obvious physical premise. This says that if two forces of approximately equal strength are in opposition, then a third force, though weaker than either of the others, can determine the outcome by application of its strength. It is apparent that this doctrine tends to delay the tendency towards polarization. But it must be continuously applied in order to nullify that tendency.

The brilliance of the Balance of Power doctrine lies in the subtle consideration as to which of the two more powerful forces the third, and lesser, should support.

If X is slightly stronger than Y, then Z can assure the triumph of X by joining it. $X + Z$ will then be much stronger than Y, even though Z puts little weight in the scales.

In that case, however, Z will subordinate itself to X. The rulers of X will regard Z as a dependent and will dominate it not merely during the struggle with Y but even more so after Y is overcome and no longer threatens.

Therefore, according to the Balance of Power doctrine, Z should throw its weight into the scales *against* the stronger and *with* the weaker of the two rival Powers. In doing so, Z need only be sure that its military strength is somewhat greater than the difference between X and Y.

Thus, if X has 500,000 soldiers and Y 400,000, Z, maintaining an army of, say, 250,000 will nevertheless give $Y + Z$ a reassuring margin. Moreover a qualified alliance between Y and Z will hold the former back from attacking X, whereas any alliance between X and Z would merely encourage X to launch an attack which it feels almost strong enough to attempt alone.

There are, it must be realized, two important corollaries to the theory. One is that if war does come, upsetting the balance of power, then Z must be continuously prepared to shift its position in order to restore the balance. If $Y + Z$ overcome X, then Z must first endeavor to see that X retains substantial strength, and must further be prepared to join X against Y, if necessary to keep power in balance.

In other words, any demand for unconditional sur-

render, and any strongly punitive peace treaty, is absolutely incompatible with the policy of balanced power.

The second corollary is that the rulers of the state practicing the balance of power must have a free hand to direct a policy that is necessarily cold-blooded, as well as ingenious and intellectual. If the emotions of the people have been deliberately inflamed against the enemy, and if the flower of their youth has been killed in the fighting, the citizens of Z can scarcely be expected to turn overnight to praising enemy X and denouncing ally Y.

This means that political democracy makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any government to pursue a balance of power policy.

It is certainly no mere coincidence that England abandoned this policy, after practicing it for four centuries, when the aristocratic Foreign Office became subject to the emotional control of a democratic electorate. The Balance of Power policy was terminated by Britain when, in the "khaki election" of 1918, Prime Minister Lloyd George promised to "squeeze Germany until the pips squeak". Under the theory of balanced power the real interest of Britain, in 1918, was to insure that France should be slightly strengthened and Germany slightly weakened. But popular sentiment, seduously inflamed against the "Huns", would not permit this outcome.

Instead, the collapse of Czarist Russia was complemented by the planned destruction of Austria-Hungary and the political humiliation of Germany. It was impossible to re-establish any balance of power on those ruins, in which the new political components of Hitler-

ism and Bolshevism took root and started to polarize in the form of Fascism vs. Communism.

4.

THE DOCTRINE of the Balance of Power did not definitely originate with any single statesman, to meet any particular emergency, but was rather the instinctive adaptation of foreign policy to the political situation that confronted England at the time of Henry VIII.

Unable to dictate to the more powerful monarchs of France and Spain, Henry—or rather his able Minister, Thomas Wolsey—began to develop the idea of allying England against any Continental ruler who threatened to become supreme. Thus England, by leaning this way or that, could maintain a political balance, stabilize peace and simultaneously advance its own interests. Much the same policy had been recommended a little earlier to Lorenzo, the ruler of Florence, by Machiavelli.

Wolsey became Chancellor of England in 1515. Thereafter, for four centuries, every English government consistently directed foreign policy so that its alliances should be of purely temporary nature and calculated to prevent any other power from becoming dominant in Europe.

In maintaining the balance of power England, during this long period, was in turn allied with, or at war with, almost every European country. This situation un-

doubtedly helped to develop the English practice of magnanimity to the defeated foe. When the enemy of one decade was likely to be the ally of the next it was unwise, as well as unsporting, to destroy his recuperative capacity.

Indeed it should be emphasized that the Balance of Power doctrine was necessarily incompatible with punitive peace settlements. As the doctrine maintained that no country should be exalted, so it also prescribed that no country should be humiliated. Any treaty that the loser could reasonably call vindictive would undermine the entire policy of balanced power.

Napoleon, in his final exile at St. Helena, was utterly unable to understand the moderation of Castlereagh towards defeated France. "What great advantage, what just compensations", inquired the fallen dictator, "has he acquired for his country?" But Napoleon, like many lesser men of the same mould, had no sympathy with or understanding of Castlereagh's aristocratic thesis of "security but not revenge".¹

The Congress of Vienna, after accepting Castlereagh's insistence on keeping power in balance, made settlements which preserved the European order, though with diminishing political stability, for another century. After the Treaty of Versailles, however, the balance of power could not be restored. The heritage of the doctrine was strong enough to inspire British resistance to the arrogant Nazi-Fascist Axis. But all remaining semblance of a European power balance disappeared when the close of

¹ Harold Nicolson: *The Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company; 1946), pp. 234-35.

World War II brought the triumphant Russian armies to the Elbe and into occupation of both Berlin and Vienna. Since 1945 the question for British foreign policy has been not can the balance of power be restored, but what will replace it?

Viewed in perspective, the historical significance of the Balance of Power doctrine is that it delayed the polarization of power, between two implacable enemies, that characterized both the ancient world, and the era that opened with the close of World War II.

France under Napoleon, Germany under the Kaiser and again under Hitler, made enormous, and temporarily successful, efforts to consolidate Europe under the control of a single government. British opposition, based fundamentally on the Balance of Power doctrine, was mainly instrumental in stopping all these efforts. But the German wars drained British strength almost as completely as the Peloponnesian conflict destroyed that of Athens.

As dominance in the state system then passed from both Hellenic factions, so, between 1914 and 1945, it passed from Europe, to be divided between the United States and Russia, the Rome and Carthage of the modern world.

The Ethics of Foreign Policy

THE ARCHITECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY, THROUGHOUT THE ages, have frequently asserted that morality plays an important part in their official planning and conduct.

This dubious claim has received much partisan support, but relatively little objective examination.¹ The failure to exercise the critical faculty towards the acts of one's own government, while readily believing the worst in respect to the acts of other governments, is a tribute to the virtue of patriotism rather than to the quality of scientific analysis. The law of averages alone would indicate, without reference to cases, that in the countless number of disputes between sovereignties, no single government is likely to have demonstrated superior morality consistently, except in the opinion of its own adherents.

The logical assumption would be that the foreign policy of any government is seldom completely "good", in the sense of being a perfect exponent of the moral code of its time and place, and equally seldom absolutely "evil", in the sense of being wholly oblivious to current moral standards.

¹ Thucydides was one notable exception to this generality. Another is Charles A. Beard: *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940* (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1946).

From the ethical viewpoint the complexion of foreign policy would seem to be a habitual, though not uniform, gray. Specific cases of the larger admixture of white or black, in this or that instance, can be and are continuously cited in the special pleading of nationalistic historians.

It is therefore the more desirable to indicate precisely why moral considerations, while seldom altogether ignored, are nevertheless of wholly secondary importance in determining the relations of governments, one to another.

2.

MEN, or most of them at any rate, are endowed by their Creator with a moral sense. They possess an intangible organ, to which we give the name of "conscience", that distinguishes between the more and the less admirable choices in all the countless occasions of decision that occur in the lifetime of an individual.

Conscience may be strong to the extreme of obduracy, or weak to the point of impotence, but it is seldom or never altogether non-existent. Men have this inborn sense of "knowing with", or being privy to, a code of moral conduct. Without conscience, all aspects of social life would be far more chaotic than is actually the case. To the degree that men will not obey natural law it is therefore reasonable to subject them to the artificial law that the State imposes.

But the State, which is the most complicated product of social development as yet fully achieved, has no moral sense and, in spite of its law courts and enforcement agencies, possesses no organ that can be compared with the human conscience. The Church, as distinct from the State, is of course deeply and continuously concerned with moral issues. The Church, however, no longer dominates the State, even in countries where a particular religion is legally "established". It is, for better or worse, the other way round.

Of course the State as an instrument may be utilized to forward morality, and to oppose immorality. And in doing this, whether by legislative action or executive fiat, it reflects both the influence of the individual conscience and the prevalent morality of a particular time and place. Nevertheless it remains true that the State can achieve good only by the application of coercion to its subjects. It substitutes the rigid compulsion of man-made law for the less well codified but morally more impelling influence of natural law. And a community is certainly better governed when citizens help each other because they want to do so than when, as subjects, they perform these duties to avoid fine or imprisonment.

The State, in short, is the repository of physical rather than moral power. While this physical strength can be used for moral ends it can equally well be, and often has been, placed at the service of an immoral philosophy. The American case against Soviet Russia rests on the evidence that this distortion is currently dominant there. We have no case against the Russians for seeking to protect them-

selves against invasion of their territory. We do the same ourselves.

Although the State has no conscience its so-called "welfare" aspects substitute for the function of this organ in the social activities of the individual. To the extent that the Welfare State deprives the individual of power to do good or evil as he sees fit there is, of course, encroachment on the sphere of personal morality, in behalf of governmentally defined morality.

In Soviet Russia, where God is virtually outlawed,² this encroachment of positive law on natural law has reached the stage of almost complete substitution. In the United States there is still a valiant and partially successful effort to oppose Socialism, which may be accurately defined as the political system that seeks to take the right of moral decision from free individuals in order to vest it in officials serving the State.

3.

It is frequently and often persuasively argued that the increasing complexity of human life, and the growing interdependence of men in modern society, makes the expansion of State authority inevitable and indeed imperative.

² Lenin wrote: "We do not believe in God" and therefore "repudiate all morality that is taken outside of human class concepts". Nikolai Lenin: *Selected Works* (New York: Universal Distributors Company; 1947). Vol. XVII, pp. 321-22.

Much that is specious can be detected in this argument, but even if it were wholly conclusive an issue of great political and moral moment would still remain to be reconciled. Whenever and however the State assumes the power of decision there must be an equivalent surrender of power on the part of the subjects. Encroachment may be on the freedom of the market, in the economic sphere; on the freedom of worship, in the religious sphere; on the freedom of criticism, in the political sphere. But fundamentally the encroachment is always on freedom, in one or another aspect of this condition for which the human being has not merely a biological but also an often passionate and deeply spiritual yearning.

Properly speaking, there is no such thing as freedom *from* something. "Freedom from fear" is a meaningless expression which, as coined by President Roosevelt, presumably means "Security from fear". Freedom, being the political condition in which the individual retains his natural power of choice, must always be *for* something. The choice of the free individual may be neither intelligent nor moral, but it is always a definite choice—in behalf of some selected course out of the many that are usually available.

It is the belief of the Socialist that it is socially advantageous when the State assumes the power of choice for the individual. Sometimes the argument is that the average person has no opportunity, and sometimes that he has no capacity, to choose wisely and well. But whether the emphasis in the argument is humanitarian or autocratic, the net result of its successful application

is the same. The power in the people is contracted and the power of the State is enlarged.

Much more is involved here than the amount of spending power left to the taxpayer after Big Government has taken its ever-increasing slice. The power of the individual to act as his conscience dictates is also taken from him by the State. Government may, because of the heritage of freedom, be patient and relatively gentle with the conscientious objector. It may, when the political heritage is tyrannical, dispose of him by firing squad. But either way his right to follow the dictates of conscience is called in question.

Since the State does not and cannot possess the organ of conscience, and since the individual conscience alone gives human life a moral direction, it follows that the enlargement of State power is necessarily at the expense not only of freedom, but also of morality. This means that the Socialist, whether he realizes it or not, has actually a very low regard for the human race. The criticism that he lavishes on "Wall Street" or other products of the free enterprise system is basically a criticism of the concept of freedom. Only those who do not really believe in human decency can possibly argue consistently that the freedom of individuals should be contracted by enlarging the power of officialdom. Only those who regard the human conscience as a wholly ineffective instrument would lessen its authority in behalf of a political organism that has no conscience. Only those who have no faith in the efficacy of natural law would displace, rather than fortify, the divine code by governmental action.

And only those Americans who misunderstand or dislike their own political system could argue for monopolistic enlargement of the Federal Government in the face of James Madison's unchallengeable explanation that we "rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government".³

4.

ALL THIS consideration has a very real bearing on the subject of foreign policy, in every age and at any place.

Although the State is an amoral instrumentality, without a conscience and with no inherent sense of right and wrong, its actions towards its subjects are always to some extent restrained and guided by the prevalent morality of the people. The most complete autocrat must give consideration to the inborn sense of justice and decency among those over whom he rules. Even so profligate an emperor as Frederick II sought by every means available in the Thirteenth Century to win support in his struggles with the Papacy.⁴ And the efforts of Dr. Goebbels' "Ministry of Enlightenment" in behalf of Hitler were merely a contemporary illustration of the tyrant's ever-

³ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay: *The Federalist* (New York: The Macmillan Company; 1948), No. 39.

⁴ The effect of moral considerations on the actions of this atheistic dictator is examined in a recent novel centering on St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Quiet Light*, by Louis de Wohl (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company; 1950).

present anxiety for popular recognition of moral purpose.

In dealings with other sovereignties, however, political rulers have never been and are not now much influenced by ethical considerations as such. Rulers raise no taxes from those outside the area of their control and therefore have no politically compelling reason to treat the subjects of other sovereigns with respect. It is not that the ruler is less humanitarian in his instincts or more immoral in his behavior than any other individual. But having the responsibility of the state on his shoulders, the tendency is to put what seems to be its immediate interest above all other considerations, including those of an ethical nature.

In time of war this subordination of ethical considerations is of course especially pronounced. Stalin merely phrased it a little more bluntly than is customary when on April 12, 1943, he wired Winston Churchill: "I wish you to kill the enemy and capture as many prisoners and trophies as possible."⁵

A year later, on May 24, 1944, Churchill himself was informing the House of Commons that: "In one place we support a King, in another a Communist. There is no attempt by us to enforce particular ideologies. We only want to beat the enemy . . ."

On August 12 of the same year President Roosevelt, speaking at Puget Sound Navy Yard, informed the American people that: "The word and honor of Japan cannot be trusted. . . . But with the end of a Japanese

⁵ Quoted in Winston Churchill: *The Hinge of Fate* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company; 1950), p. 757.

threat, soon we hope, there is an excellent outlook for a permanent peace in the whole of the Pacific area."

In contrast with these heated observations, by members of the great wartime triumvirate, one may profitably study the dispassionate and prescient statement made during the same period by Pope Pius, to the College of Cardinals, on June 2, 1944:

"In any war where one of the belligerents succeeded only through the power of the sword and other means of irresistible coercion, in reaching a clean and unquestioned victory, it would find itself in the position of being physically able to dictate an inequitable peace imposed by force. But it is certain that nobody, whose conscience is illumined by the principles of true justice, could recognize in such a precarious solution the character of assured and prudent wisdom."

The absence of any ethical content in foreign policy during time of war is too obvious to need much citation or emphasis. Many would be inclined to discount this characteristic, however, by saying that war represents a breakdown, rather than an aspect, of foreign policy, and by asserting further that even in wartime the chief executive of a democratic nation is under constitutional restraints which tend to check immoral conduct on his part.

Unfortunately, both qualifications are more apparent than real. The President of the United States is nominally subject to many Constitutional restraints, in time of war as well as in time of peace. However, aside from the indication that the United States can now be plunged into a major war, as in Korea, by Presidential edict, it is

also clear that during the fighting foreign policy decisions of the greatest moment will be made by the President alone. As Mr. Roosevelt said, reporting on a selected part of the Yalta Agreement to Congress on March 1, 1945, the formula for the future of Poland was "agreed to by Russia, by Britain *and by me*" (emphasis supplied). Neither the Polish nor the American—nor incidentally the British and Russian—peoples had any say in the matter.

As against the theory that war is a mere interruption of the normal conduct of foreign policy, one recalls the aphorism of von Clausewitz, to the effect that war has always been definitely an instrument of national policy and that peacetime diplomacy only fills in the chinks until the time has come for the State to strike with military force. Certainly in the Prussian tradition, from Hegel on, there is little to indicate that peace is the normal condition of a nation, war a mere unfortunate aberration. Though Prussia is destroyed, the "Prussian doctrine" of Nietzsche—that the State is "beyond good and evil", determining morals for itself—is today stronger than ever before.

5.

BECAUSE individuals for the most part possess a moral sense there has been, usually under religious leadership, a long and valiant effort to introduce an ethical content

into the theory and practice of foreign policy. This effort has taken two distinct forms. One is the long-standing attempt to make those who control foreign policy strictly accountable to elected representatives of the people. The other is the more recent endeavor to establish an enforceable international law, involving the creation of an international political authority empowered and competent to take preventive action against a government whose foreign policy threatens a breach of peace.

The latter effort was obviously impractical until nations as we know them today had taken form as disciplined political units, with governments competent to keep order at home as a preliminary to making international commitments. Also, there had to be development of communications, trade and travel on a large scale before the need for any international political authority became apparent to people as a whole.

Aside from these positive factors, two of a negative nature helped pave the way for interest in world government. One was the decline of vital religious interest, which followed the fragmentizing of the Christian church throughout European countries that once had recognized the spiritual supremacy of Rome. The other was the increasing destructiveness of war. With no universally recognized religious authority, and with all existing political authorities seriously menaced by the effects of scientific war, the argument for international organization was greatly strengthened. Its development will be considered in the two following chapters.

The effort to establish popular control over the for-

eign policy of an individual sovereign, however, had made great headway long before concerts, or leagues, or unions, of nations had become more substantial than the dreams of idealistic philosophers. Indeed the desire to regulate the foreign policy of Charles I, who conspired with other monarchs to maintain his theory of rule by divine right, was a basic cause of the English Revolution in the Seventeenth Century. The influence of that revolution in the establishment of our own American governmental system was of course pronounced.

Both because of its intrinsic importance, and because of its striking applicability to our modern constitutional problems, the historic case of "Ship Money" may be used as an illustration. In Anglo-Saxon times "shipgeld" had been levied on English coastal towns to provide a defense against piracy. Charles I, lacking funds to build a navy to support his tortuous foreign policy, attempted to revive this type of taxation, hoping thereby to avoid parliamentary restraint and inquiry.

In 1637 John Hampden, a leading Member of Parliament and cousin of Oliver Cromwell, refused point-blank to pay the Ship Money tax, calling it tyrannical and illegal. He was arrested, tried, found guilty and imprisoned. But so many others followed Hampden's example that in 1641, a year before the Civil War broke out, Parliament declared that the judgments "against the said John Hampden were and are contrary to and against the laws and statutes of this realm, the right of property, the liberty of the subjects, former resolutions in Parliament, and the Petition of Right". The legislation also ruled that no further taxation in the form of "ship writs"

should be attempted. None has been, in England, to this day.⁶

Many other instances, from many countries, could be cited from the long effort to bring the conduct of foreign policy under popular control. All of them would be found to rest on the principle that arbitrary executive authority in this field is an intolerable infringement of "the liberty of the subjects".

Liberty, of course, is an ethical concept, based on the religious belief that men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights", as the Declaration of Independence asserts. And it is in no way accidental that the endeavor to give an ethical content to foreign policy has made most headway under representative government, and especially in those countries where men with a deep religious faith are willing to challenge the authority of the State.

The memory of John Hampden, who later gave his life fighting for Parliament against an arbitrary king, is part of the testimony to the vitality of that challenge.

⁶ Documentation in Samuel Rawson Gardner: *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press; 1906), pp. 189-192.

Co-operation by Sovereign States

COMMUNITIES MUST BE UNIFIED WITHIN THEMSELVES before their governments can work together effectively for common ends. That is why the development of nationalism was a condition precedent to the building of any co-operative international organization.

Parochial loyalties, so pronounced in the Canadian province of Quebec, and in the southern states of the United States, unquestionably impede the growth of nationalism and make the centralized direction of a nation's foreign policy more difficult. Yet the doctrine of home rule, or "state's rights" as the localization of political power is known in our Federal Republic, represents much more than a mere conservative fidelity to inherited customs.

As charity begins at home, so should political action. Aristotle was convinced of this and it was also the constant theme of such great Hebrew prophets as Isaiah. Faith in local self-government, in which the American colonists were well trained, is the foundation of the Constitution of the United States. A staunch New Englander, Gamaliel Bradford, pointed a nice paradox when he chose *Lee the American* as the title for a biography of the patriotic Virginian whose technical treason still seems

to many as laudable as that of George Washington before him.

The political dilemma partially solved for the United States by its Constitution, but still largely unresolved for the world as a whole today, is how to achieve the benefits of orderly inter-state co-operation without sacrificing the values inherent in state sovereignty.

The type of consolidation most frequently attempted is that which was described long since in the ancient fable of the Gordian Knot. Alexander, told that whosoever could unloose that recalcitrant tangle would hold the gorgeous East in fee, proceeded to slice the knot apart with his sword.

This method of arbitrary subjection, by military dictatorship, has been attempted time and again. The militant Communism of Soviet Russia is only the latest exposition of the theory of world rule by an elite or "chosen" people. And it is not without highly respectable indorsement. Isaiah has been mentioned. While he predicted the day when nations "shall beat their swords into plowshares", he also promised Zion that: "Strangers shall stand and feed your flocks, and the sons of the alien shall be your plowmen and your vinedressers".¹

The political lesson of the New Testament, as distinct from the Old, is that in the sight of God there are no such people as "the sons of the alien". In this gospel of universal brotherhood and natural human dignity lies one of the great landmarks of political, as well as religious, thought. For it led naturally, and indeed continues to lead, towards concerted Christian effort for the unity of

¹ Chs. 2:4 and 61:5.

peoples based on "the tolerance of variety" rather than "the imposition of uniformity".²

Roman political theory, under the Empire, was that all conquered peoples should coalesce with Rome, on terms that were frequently both generous and enlightened. A large measure of autonomy was given to the many provincial towns, more willingly because their government was generally modelled on that of Rome itself. Local customs were respected. Diversity in all matters not of major imperial interest was tolerated. But the provinces were always subject. And as the strain of imperial defense became more burdensome, as taxation increased and the machinery of government became more complicated and more centralized, the amount of local autonomy was steadily curtailed. The Roman Empire was never a union of equal sovereignties, and became steadily more of a military dictatorship as its end approached.

Almost alone of the cities brought within the Roman Empire, Athens, because of its cultural repute, was permitted a nominal independence. And it was in Athens, where the citizens "spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing", that the Apostle Paul first foreshadowed the philosophy of modern international organization. In Paul's words: "God that made the world and all things therein . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation."³

² F. Melian Stawell: *The Growth of International Thought* (New York: Henry Holt & Company; 1930), Ch. I.

³ Acts 17:21, 24-26.

It is not within the competence of this study to weight, or even catalog, the reasons why early and medieval Christendom failed to achieve any lasting political unity in Europe. But it is certain that the Protestant Reformation, whether or not justified by results, both coincided with and stimulated the separatist nationalisms on which the contemporary effort for international organization is based.

Scientific progress, especially the conjunction of stratoplanes and atom bombs, has now gone far to reduce national frontiers to the insignificant proportions in which Paul saw them. Also we have begun to learn again what Paul realized on the road to Damascus—that ideas permeate political barriers; that the future does not belong, as he told the Athenians, to those who “think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man’s device”.

Foreign policy, like any other aspect of politics, must have some “Godhead”, some permanent standards, or else be merely opportunistic. It could well be that to achieve peace the foreign policy of the future will have to adhere more closely to the teachings of Paul than to the less ethical methods of either Alexander or Machiavelli.

2.

THE FIRST world-wide attempt to find a workable substitute for modern international anarchy was the League of Nations. This heroic effort was a natural sequel to a

war that had demonstrated simultaneously the destructiveness of modern weapons, the organizing capacity of the modern state, and the inability of traditional foreign policy to keep that capacity channeled within the dykes of peace.

The name of an American President—Woodrow Wilson—is indis severably linked with the establishment of that League of Nations which his country never joined. Controversy over whether this nation should or should not have done so has tended to obscure the enormous political importance of the action that *was* taken—the full-scale participation of this Republic in what was essentially a European war.

American intervention, after the uneasy neutrality of 1914-17, insured the defeat of Germany. But in doing so it was instrumental in creating a wholly new political pattern, accounting for much of the pronounced instability of international politics after 1918.

American participation prevented the negotiated peace, in the traditional European manner, which otherwise would almost certainly have terminated the first World War. American participation therefore helped to put an end to the British Balance of Power policy which, as explained in Chapter III, was wholly incompatible with the dictated settlement of Versailles.

Simultaneously, and in the event unfortunately, President Wilson introduced non-European leadership into the making of a peace that, however worthy in the intent, resulted in the exacerbation of European hatreds to a degree where no foreign policy was able to cope with

them. Although the United States was instrumental in bringing about this unhappy "settlement", it refused any guarantee of its permanence. Neither the interventionism of 1917 nor the isolationism of 1919 were necessarily mistakes. But the two, taken in conjunction, constitute one of history's historic foreign policy blunders.

Because of the then predominant isolationism Americans, in 1919, either were not interested in, or were generally antagonistic to, the idea of preserving peace by balanced power. So, somewhat reluctantly, British statesmanship abandoned the doctrine that for four centuries had served it well, to line up with the developing American objective, which was a "League to Enforce Peace". Thus, primarily through Anglo-American effort, the League of Nations was born. The project did not evoke any great contemporary enthusiasm in other countries.

3.

IN THE BACKGROUND of the League was a long series of "Grand Designs" and "Projects of Perpetual Peace" intended to secure for the system of nation-states something of the centralized authority that had characterized both the medieval church and the earlier empire of Rome. One of these forerunners, especially interesting to Americans, was William Penn's *Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*. This was first published

in 1690, eight years after the great Quaker politician had written *The Frame of Government of Pennsylvania*, still the foundation of the Constitution of that state.

Penn's scheme for European federation is surprisingly modern in thought, though the archaic language is often difficult for all but patient readers. It envisaged an annual General Assembly of governmental delegates "before which sovereign assembly should be brought all differences depending between one sovereign and another that cannot be made up by private embassies before the sessions begin."⁴

Although a Quaker, Penn clearly anticipated the development of collective action against aggression. The only three ways in which "peace is broken", he said, is "to keep, to recover, or to add [control of territory]". His formula was to have the proposed Assembly offer arbitration in every international dispute. If the arbitral judgment were refused or rejected and hostilities begun by one government, then, in Penn's words: "all the other sovereignties, united as one strength, shall compel the submission and performance of the sentence, with damages to the suffering party, and charges to the sovereignties that obliged their submission."

Penn's theory of collective action against aggression was more than two centuries ahead of its time. It was revived, as a suggested "masterstroke", by Theodore Roosevelt, in his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1910. Five years later the essence of Penn's plan was put forward, in developed form, by William Howard Taft,

⁴ William Penn: *Peace of Europe* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; 1942), p. 8.

like T. R. then also a Republican ex-President. In a speech at Cleveland, on May 12, 1915, Mr. Taft laid down four fundamental provisions for a "League of Peace", of which the final one read:

"The members of the League shall agree that if any member of the League shall bring war against any other member of the League, without first having submitted the question, if found justiciable, to the arbitral court provided in the fundamental compact, or without having submitted the question, if found non-justiciable, to the Commission of Conciliation for its examination, consideration and recommendation, then the remaining members of the League agree to join in the forcible defense of the member thus prematurely attacked." ⁵

The move to establish "sanctions", as collective economic or military action against an aggressor came to be known, was not only of American origin, but was also entirely nonpartisan in its initial development. The leadership of the League to Enforce Peace was primarily Republican, but as early as the autumn of 1914 President Woodrow Wilson was thinking along these lines. Soon after the outbreak of the European war he anticipated that "all nations must be absorbed into some great association of nations whereby all shall guarantee the integrity of each so that any one nation violating the agreement between all of them shall bring punishment on itself automatically." ⁶

⁵ Cf. Theodore Marburg: *Development of the League of Nations Idea* (New York: The Macmillan Company; 1932), pp. 703-17.

⁶ For documentation, v. Felix Morley, *The Society of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution; 1932), especially Ch. I.

The later Republican hostility to the League of Nations, spearheaded by Senators Brandegee, Borah, Hiram Johnson, Knox and Lodge, had many facets, aside from the traditional antagonism to a development criticizable as an "entangling alliance". Mistrust of the greatly exaggerated "super-state" aspects of the organization was one. Doubt as to the desirability and efficacy of the sanctions provided by Articles X and XVI of the Covenant was another. There was a dubious but shrewd effort to detach Irish-Americans from traditional Democratic loyalties by propaganda asserting, with little validity, that the League would prevent Irish independence. President Wilson's failure to take any Republican Senators to the Peace Conference, and other instances of executive intransigence, undoubtedly contributed to the Senate failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, of which the League Covenant was made Part I.

This unfortunate integration of a punitive treaty with a charter for peaceful international organization was the source of much of the American hostility to the League. The intention, in welding the two discordant documents together, was of course to insure simultaneous Senate ratification of Covenant and Treaty. The outcome was that neither got ratified. From this not even Germany profited, since the separate treaty of the United States with that country did not lessen any of the penalties of Versailles. Some encouragement, however, was given to the Nazis, who were later able to reason that since many Americans had opposed the making of the Versailles "Dictate", they would presumably be indifferent to its breaking.

Another unfortunate effect was to spread the belief, in American thinking, that the President is justified in trying to circumvent Congressional control in the field of foreign policy.

4.

So the League of Nations came to its inauspicious birth. It had, however, introduced a new system for eliminating war, a plan not even considered by the Concert of Europe set up after the Napoleonic Wars. In place of any continental Concert or Balance of Power, hope for preserving peace was now centered on the idea of world-wide collective action against the aggressor, definable as such by action of an international organization and subject to punishment by that organization after definition. Every Member of the League was pledged to adapt its foreign policy to the obligations of the Covenant. And many of them conscientiously endeavored to do so.

“Half a league onward” was the cynical gibe, when the League of Nations formally established headquarters at Geneva, on May 5, 1919. Nevertheless, during the next twenty years, it achieved many solid accomplishments in the field of inter-governmental organization. This was especially apparent in the application of international administration, by an international civil service, to various technical undertakings. Here the League Secretariat further demonstrated the mutual benefits of that

pooling of sovereignty which had been foreseen in respect to the mails by the Universal Postal Union as early as 1874.⁷

Although never a member of the League, the United States early became an active participant in practically every aspect of its non-political program, from the control of narcotics to preventive action against plagues. American public opinion fully supported this effort to develop and systematize the network of international contacts, sponsored by but by no means confined to official agencies. As this network grew, its tangible accomplishment seemed to justify the insight of William Penn, who had argued that under his plan "sovereign princes and states . . . remain as sovereign at home as they ever were."⁸ For some years, during the third decade of the Twentieth Century, it appeared that the League would really solve the problem of reconciling the preservation of national sovereignty with the progressive development of international co-operation.

The breakdown came with the demonstration that the Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers could not cope with the problem of disarmament. Penn had anticipated that under a League of Nations, composed of independent states, each national "war establishment may be reduced, which will indeed of course follow, or be better employed to the advantage of the public." Disarmament did not "of course follow" under the League of Nations. On the contrary, the effort to achieve disarmament proved to be the reef on which the organization foundered.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 229 ff.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

The obligation of the League of Nations to achieve disarmament was explicit. In the first place the unilateral disarmament enforced on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles was justified by the pledge of voluntary action to this end on the part of the victors. Part V of that Treaty, specifying the details of German disarmament, said: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow . . ."

These subsequent German disarmament clauses, comprising 54 separate articles, concluded with one giving the Council of the League of Nations sole right to investigate their observance. Furthermore, Article VIII of the League Covenant made "the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety" a condition of League membership. That cautious wording clearly indicates the compromise between the French fear of Germany, and the Anglo-American faith in the efficacy of collective action.

A real effort, extending over several years, was made at Geneva to fulfill the disarmament obligations of the Covenant. In spite of active American governmental assistance it failed, and the failure was used as a legitimate excuse by Hitler for re-arming Germany. That, together with the Japanese aggression in China and the Italian attack on Ethiopia, sounded the death knell of the League of Nations.

Its last substantive action was at least courageous. On December 14, 1939, the Council and Assembly of the League by unanimous vote expelled Russia from mem-

bership, for refusing to accept mediation in the Soviet war of aggression against Finland. But under the impact of the greater war already started, this last gesture by the disintegrating League had little or no practical effect.

The United Nations

THE UNITED NATIONS, LIKE THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS before it, developed from a wartime alliance. Its actual origin was a declaration, signed in Washington, on January 1, 1942, whereby the representatives of 26 governments subscribed to the Atlantic Charter and pledged themselves "not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies". Adherence to this declaration was left open to other governments.

In a simultaneous public statement the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, emphasized that collective action against aggression was the primary objective of the proposed organization. He described the declaration as "a living proof that law-abiding and peaceful nations can unite in using the sword when necessary to preserve liberty and justice and the fundamental values of mankind".¹

The Charter of the United Nations, adopted at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, was designed to solve the two major problems that had certainly been instrumental in the failure of the League of Nations.

In the first place the U.N. Charter was drafted to stand by itself, as a separate treaty among sovereign powers, to be adopted prior to, and therefore wholly unconnected with, any legal settlements of the 1939-45 con-

¹ Dept. of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 3, 1942, p. 4.

flicts. In the second place the Charter sought to set up meticulously detailed machinery for collective action "with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression".

Many of the provisions of this section of the Charter (Articles 39 to 51 inclusive) have now only a melancholy historic interest. Such is certainly the case with Article 47, providing for a "Military Staff Committee" including the Russian Chief of Staff, to "be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council." This follows Article 45, stipulating that "Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action."

None of these "police force" provisions were made contingent upon or were otherwise weakened by any defined or implied obligation for national disarmament. The architects of the Charter had concluded from the failure of the Covenant that to put disarmament ahead of enforcement is placing the cart before the horse. This time our State Department, which has major credit for the U.N. Charter, was determined not to nullify collective action in advance. Ironically, the very strength of this determination helped to defeat its purpose.

With almost unbelievable lack of foresight both the Dumbarton Oaks draft and the final Charter assumed that the United Nations would automatically remain united, after as during the war. All the lessons of history in respect to the ephemeral quality of such alliances, and all the voluminous Communist proclamations on the sub-

ject of Soviet aims, were alike disregarded. Nevertheless, strong pressure was exerted from Washington to silence any constructive criticism of the Charter during the drafting period. Those who sought to point out even the most glaring deficiencies of the new instrument were emotionally condemned as "isolationists" or worse. Speaking at the final session of the United Nations Conference, just before the signing of the Charter, President Truman said:

"The forces of reaction and tyranny all over the world will try to keep the United Nations from remaining united. . . . They are trying even now. To divide and conquer was—and still is—their plan. They still try to make one ally suspect the other, hate the other, desert the other. But I know I speak for every one of you when I say that the United Nations will remain united. They will not be divided by propaganda either before the Japanese surrender—or after."²

Immediately following this speech the Secretary General of the San Francisco Conference, Mr. Alger Hiss, flew with the original copy of the Charter to Washington to obtain its immediate ratification by the Senate. On July 2, 1945, President Truman asserted that: "The choice . . . is between this Charter and no Charter at all." Four weeks later, on July 28, 1945, the Senate ratified in a burst of bipartisan enthusiasm, with only two dissenting votes.

² *Ibid.*, July 1, 1945.

2.

IN AVOIDING what were deemed to be the major mistakes in the Covenant of the League, the Charter of U.N. made several wholly new blunders, injurious to the objective of making collective action effective.

The first of those was the failure to formulate any definition of aggression, which was a rather disconcerting omission in an instrument designed primarily to prevent what it did not define. Nor was this failure due to the difficulty of such a definition. Many of the governments represented at San Francisco had already approved the definition of aggression embodied a month earlier in the Act of Chapultepec. As adopted by the Inter-American Conference at Mexico City in March, 1945, this says ". . . invasion by armed forces of one state into the territory of another, trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in accordance therewith, shall constitute an act of aggression."³

The Covenant of the League had also sidestepped any precise definition of aggression, but in case of "any dispute likely to lead to a rupture" had provided (Article XV) that "the Council either unanimously *or by a majority vote* shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto". The key words here have been italicized.

Under this provision the League of Nations investi-

³ *Ibid.*, March 4, 1945.

gated and denounced the Japanese invasion of Manchuria; applied sanctions against Italy for Mussolini's bare-faced aggression against Ethiopia; expelled Russia from membership for its refusal to mediate the dispute with Finland. To stop aggression by a Great Power proved to be beyond the strength of the League. But in these three major instances the Geneva organization was at least able promptly to identify the culprit; in each case a "Great Power".

Even determination of an act of aggression was made extremely difficult by the Charter of the United Nations. Responsibility for this was placed in the hands of the Security Council, but an unlimited veto on all but "procedural matters" was simultaneously given to each of the five permanent members of the Council, chosen as the most powerful nations. While Article 27 of the Charter provides that "a party to a dispute", in the determination of aggression, "shall abstain from voting", this Article as a whole made it entirely feasible for any of the five Great Powers effectively to block any action by the United Nations against an aggressor supported by one of these five Powers, as was to be demonstrated in the case of Korea.

Furthermore, by placing major responsibility for preventing aggression in the hands of the Council, the Charter makes it a very cumbersome process to get the matter into the hands of the Assembly, where (Article 18) decisions "on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting".

Finally, it was made impossible to expel an obstructionist Great Power from membership in U.N. Under

Article 6, expulsion must be "upon the recommendation of the Security Council". Yet any Council recommendation on any but "procedural matters" is always subject to the veto. To make confusion worse it was agreed at San Francisco that the veto applies in any dispute as to what is or is not a procedural matter.

In short, virtually any action by the United Nations can always be severely impeded, if not completely blocked, by any one of the five permanent—and they are permanent—members of the Council.

All these deficiencies were pointed out during the drafting period of the U.N. Charter. All of the criticism was brushed off by the Department of State as captious, ill-informed or obstructionist. So the American people not unnaturally assumed that President Roosevelt spoke from superior wisdom when he told Congress that the Yalta Agreement:

"... was a successful effort by the three leading nations [Great Britain, Soviet Russia, the United States] to find a common ground for peace. It spells the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balances of power and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries—and have failed."⁴

Yalta certainly prevented any revival of the Balance of Power policy. But consequent substitution of the verbose and ill-drafted Charter of the United Nations proved sadly to be merely another "expedient", based on the demonstrably fallacious assumption that the wartime alliance of the United States and Soviet Russia would prove enduring.

⁴ Address to Congress, March 1, 1945.

3.

ITS INEXCUSABLE constitutional defects were not the only reason for the initial frustration of the United Nations in the Korean dispute. But these defects do explain why a United Nations army was forced to fight Chinese Communist forces for over two months before Communist China (on February 1, 1951) could be even theoretically defined by the Assembly as an aggressor.

Only by something approaching a subterfuge was the international organization able to take action in Korea in the first place. Russia was boycotting all U.N. organs, to protest the refusal to replace Nationalist China with the Communist regime, when the North Korean army moved across the 38th Parallel. In the absence of any Russian representative the Council took action, under the provision of Article 28 that says: "The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously." This article is in a section entitled "Procedure" and was certainly stretched out of context to cover the situation for which it was utilized on June 27, 1950.

Whether the Kremlin overlooked this loophole for collective action, or whether Russian inaction was actually planned with a view to involving a large part of American military strength permanently in this distant theatre, remains a matter of speculation. In either case the Russian tactics, once the United Nations had committed themselves to forceful resistance of aggression,

were clever as well as irritating. Without the sacrifice of a single Russian soldier the diplomacy of Moscow successfully embroiled the United States in a costly and demoralizing war, aligned the great majority of the Chinese people against their traditional American friends, and came close to splitting the United Nations wide open on the issue of sanctions against the Peiping regime. In spite of the heavy casualties and the heroic effort of the American expeditionary force, no such diplomatic accomplishments could be inscribed on Washington's side of the ledger.

The Korean War, however, had one result of long-range significance in American foreign policy that was certainly not planned by Russian leadership. The Kremlin may have anticipated that successful aggression would destroy the U.N., like the League before it, as an effective instrumentality for the application of collective action. But Moscow could scarcely have foreseen—or there would have been more effort to prevent—the formation of close-knit American military alliances, designed to stop further Communist expansion, and therefore a threat to the Russian hegemony in Europe, if not in Asia.

Yet this historic change in the direction of American foreign policy was confirmed by the frustration of the United Nations over Korea. Certainly the United States had indicated, first by the Truman Doctrine, then by the Marshall Plan, finally by adoption of the Atlantic Pact, that it would not be isolated even though the general international organization failed. Prior to Korea, however, the American people had not expected to raise large military contingents for a Western European army,

to be mobilized there under an American commander. The Department of State, indeed, gave Congress positive assurances that this was not planned.

The frustration of the United Nations, following the failure of the League of Nations, unquestionably weakened American faith in the theory of security through collective action, directed by an inclusive international organization. Much as the British, in 1919, had shelved the Balance of Power system, in favor of the old League, so, a generation later, the United States tacitly shelved U.N., in favor of outright military alliances financed and directed from Washington.

4.

ON BALANCE, however, it cannot be flatly asserted that the United Nations failed in Korea, in the sense that the League of Nations failed in the successive Great Power aggressions of Japan in Manchuria, Italy in Ethiopia and Russia in Finland.

The preliminary result of the fighting up and down the Korean peninsula was, in addition to the wholesale slaughter and impoverishment of its pitiable inhabitants, a military stalemate. This war started with Communist aggression across the 38th Parallel. The acrimonious armistice negotiations more than a year later at least demonstrated that the aggressors were willing to accept a truce along the same wholly arbitrary line.

From the viewpoint of the United States, as a completely sovereign Power, this was a very unsatisfactory suggestion. At great cost, in lives, money and national dislocation, the Russian challenge was squarely met, and the policy of "containing Communism" temporarily vindicated in one of a large number of potentially explosive areas. But nothing fundamental was settled. The best that could be said, from the strictly American viewpoint, was that we hoped to restore an undesirable status quo, as the Berlin airlift had done in another area of dispute three years earlier.

From the viewpoint of the United Nations as a whole a much more consoling conclusion could be drawn. In spite of the constitutional defects noted in this chapter, and in spite of the adroit Russian effort to exploit those defects, the new international organization very definitely repelled a military aggression sponsored by a Great Power and its satellites. The Republic of Korea was saved, at least temporarily, from threatened annihilation. Merely to restore the status quo in Korea could be called a notable victory for the principle of collective action against aggression, however unsatisfactory for the United States as a separate sovereignty.

On the one hand, Korea demonstrated that collective action can be made effective. On the other hand this was the case only because a single Great Power threw its full military weight into the scales against aggression sponsored by another sovereignty of comparable strength.

From any dispassionate appraisal it is therefore equally

impossible to assert that collective action, as a partnership of equals, succeeded in Korea. Without the 90 per cent contribution of the United States any U.N. action there would certainly have been a dismal failure, even if it had been attempted.

Indeed, there is substantial evidence for the belief that the United States was hampered, not helped, both in military operations and in diplomatic strategy, by the decision to make the Korean war an international rather than a national undertaking. That was the impression left on many Americans by the bitter MacArthur controversy. For it is indisputable that General MacArthur was relieved of his command primarily because he wanted to win the war for the United States rather than for the U.N. as a whole. Whether or not this commander's military judgment was wise in this matter is another issue, not susceptible of proof either way. That General MacArthur sought a clear-cut American victory, rather than the inconclusive settlement visualized by President Truman and Secretary Acheson, is a matter of incontestable fact.

In its essential substance, MacArthur's argument for resolute national, rather than irresolute international, action proved more convincing. That was tacitly admitted, well in advance of the General's dismissal, by the decision of the Truman Administration to put its primary trust in a system of alliances, rather than in that of collective action. What may be called the MacArthur viewpoint had really been adopted by Secretary Acheson, in forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, more than a year before the overt aggression in Korea. The

further diplomatic effect of that war was to promote a network of Pacific security pacts as a supplement to those already sponsored for the Atlantic area.

Thus, while the United Nations was kept alive, and may in time demonstrate constructive potentialities, the polarization of the world between the American and Russian camps was actually accepted by the organization designed to end "spheres of influence". And the change took place almost on the heels of President Truman's pathetic assurance that "the United Nations will remain united". Nobody whose interest is the understanding of foreign policy could long be fooled by the pretense that the original purposes of U.N. were fulfilled in the construction of rival alliance systems directed against each other by the two most powerful permanent members of the "Security Council".


Machiavelli told us that "The Prince" must be "a great feigner and dissembler". Perhaps with this admonition in mind, Secretary of State Acheson and his aides assured Americans that these alliances were merely "regional arrangements", as visualized in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. That pretense, however, is transparent, since the North Atlantic Treaty was, by official admission, directed not against any nation outside U.N., but defensively against one of its privileged founders—the U.S.S.R.

To apprehend the magnitude of the change involved by adopting military alliances as the basis of American foreign policy, we must recall what that policy used to be.



VII

Traditional U. S. Foreign Policy



WHEN THE SENATE RATIFIED THE ATLANTIC PACT, ON July 21, 1949, by a vote of 82 to 13, a seemingly complete reversal of traditional American foreign policy was approved. In the famous Farewell Address, which is still read aloud to the House of Representatives every February 22, Washington strongly advised "as little political connection as possible" with foreign nations. He said further:

"Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.—Hence, therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities."

Isolationism from Europe was not just a personal foible of the "Father of his Country". It was a well-reasoned policy approved and advanced by all the revolutionary leaders. Even Alexander Hamilton, who favored a strong executive, demanded legislative control over the President's power to make commitments to other governments. His draft for the Constitution provided that not only treaties but also all "agreements with foreign na-

tions" should require "the advice and consent of the Senate".

A year before Yorktown was fought, John Adams wrote from Paris that "our business" with European nations "is commerce, not politics, much less war. America has been the sport of European wars and their policies long enough."

On June 12, 1783, when independence was assured, the Congress of the Confederation adopted a resolution saying: "The true interest of the states requires that they should be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations."¹

On June 25, 1787, during the formulation of the Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention, Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, made the famous speech in which he asserted: "We mistake the object of our Government if we hope or wish that it is to make us respectable abroad. Conquest or superiority among other powers is not, or ought not ever to be, the object of republican systems."²

Just a month later, on July 25, 1787, John Jay, who was Secretary of Foreign Affairs when the Constitution was adopted, asked George Washington in writing "whether it would not be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national government".³ Something

¹ Quoted in Edwin M. Borchard: *American Foreign Policy* (Indianapolis: National Foundation Press; 1946), p. 4.

² Quoted in Max Farrand: *The Records of the Federal Convention* (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1937), Vol. IV, pp. 28-29. The manuscript, in Pinckney's own handwriting, is now in the Library of Congress.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 61.

of this fear, or prejudice, is still enshrined in the Constitutional prohibitions against the acceptance of "emolument, office or title of any kind whatsoever" by any Federal employe, from any "foreign state" (Article I, Sect. 9).

Indeed, the evidence of isolationist determination in the early days of the Republic is far more unanimous, from every state of the Union, than was the case with respect to any other single political issue that could then be identified.

2.

NEVERTHELESS, this attitude was soon modified by the course of world events. Shortly before the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, in 1823, President Monroe wrote to Thomas Jefferson and to James Madison, both former Presidents and then the last of the active revolutionary statesmen, asking their opinion of the notable departure in foreign policy which he was planning. Monroe did not consult John Adams, also a former President, apparently only because the latter had then reached the advanced age of 88 and had completely retired from public life.

Under date of October 24, 1823, Jefferson replied as follows:

"Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never

to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and particularly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom."

After laying down this fundamental principle, however, Jefferson went on to indorse the proposal of British Foreign Minister Canning, for Anglo-American co-operation to prevent the restoration of European colonialism in South America. Completing the passage quoted above, Jefferson wrote:

"One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of anyone, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars."

On October 30, 1823, Madison wrote to President Monroe in like vein, his observations also having a curiously timely ring today:

". . . It is particularly fortunate that the policy of Great Britain, though guided by calculations different from ours,

has presented a co-operation for an object the same with ours. With that co-operation we have nothing to fear from the rest of Europe, and with it the best assurance of success to our laudable views. There ought not, therefore, to be any backwardness, I think, in meeting her in the way she has proposed, keeping in view, of course, the spirit and forms of the Constitution in every step taken in the road to war, which must be the last step if those short of war should be without avail."

Thus, only forty years after the recognition of American independence, within the life-span of John Adams, Jefferson and Madison, a very significant qualification of isolationism had already been established. In the words of Jefferson, certainly no slavish Anglophile: "We should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship" with Great Britain. The Monroe Doctrine was, indeed, as much a declaration of Anglo-American solidarity as a "hands off" warning to Continental Europe.⁴

3.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE, long the cornerstone of our foreign policy, had two separate but reciprocal parts. There was the warning to Europe not to intervene in American affairs. There was also the pledge, giving balance and ethical justification to that warning, that the

⁴ Complete documentation is found in J. Reuben Clark, *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine*, Dept. of State, Publication No. 37, December, 1928.

United States would not intervene in European affairs.

Thus, in enunciating the Doctrine in his message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President Monroe asserted that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

But, Monroe promptly added: "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do." And then:

" . . . Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; *to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us*; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none."

The phrase here italicized in this passage from the Monroe Doctrine demands consideration. Recognition of any *de facto* government as legitimate, regardless of its moral character or the means by which it acquired power, was of course implicit in the revolutionary origin of our own Republic. As Jefferson said: "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded, that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change those forms at its own will."⁵

⁵ Quoted, Borchard, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

In addition to automatic recognition of any stable government, whether democratic, aristocratic, autocratic or theocratic, the revolutionary origin of the United States also implied a policy of non-intervention.

This again merely conceded to others that same right to manage their own affairs that Americans had asserted for themselves. Non-intervention is specifically emphasized in the passage from the Monroe Doctrine quoted above. Non-intervention continued to be preached and practiced after the Monroe Doctrine became effective. On December 26, 1825, in a message to the Senate nominating delegates to a Pan-American congress at Panama, President John Quincy Adams said:

"It will be seen that the United States neither intend nor are expected to take part in any deliberations of a belligerent character; that the motive of their attendance is neither to contract alliances nor to engage in any undertaking or project importing hostility to any other nation."⁶

It has not been easy to efface the principle of non-intervention from American foreign policy. Indeed, as late as the middle of World War II, on November 23, 1943, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle said in an official address:

". . . from a military point of view, the proposition that the United States should engage in a series of adventures for the purpose of intervening in the affairs of other states seems merely absurd. Our divisions are thoroughly engaged in the task of smashing the Japanese and the Germans. Nor have we any intention to scrap the well-settled policy of non-

⁶ Quoted, Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

intervention in the affairs of other states. The policy of non-intervention in other peoples' affairs is and must be the first principle of sound doctrine. Unless this is the settled practice of nations, there can be no principle of sovereign equality among peace-loving states and probably no permanent peace at all. The Nazis practiced the principle of forcing their neighbor nations to install governments satisfactory to their ideas. We are content to leave to them the patent on that idea."

Non-intervention and automatic recognition of any stable government were two of the points in the three-point suspension on which the traditional American foreign policy depended. The third was neutrality.

The doctrine of neutrality, of course, is only a formalization of the principle of non-intervention, and stands or falls with the latter. Once popular American slogans, such as "freedom of the seas", recall that the United States for a long time vigorously defended "neutral rights". But the doctrine of neutrality is obviously inconsistent with that of collective security, which starts from the premise that all "peace-loving" nations should combine to resist aggression by any government, anywhere.

From this follows the conclusion that a neutral is virtually an ally of the aggressor, since under the division of "We or They" it can be said that those who are not with us are against us.

This argument would have seemed grotesque to most Americans prior to 1917. But it was advanced as official American policy by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in a radio address on April 10, 1944. Mr. Hull then asked the European neutrals "with insistence, to cease aiding our

enemy". By neutral "aid", the Secretary explained, he meant "the aid which their trade with the enemy gives him."

4.

BEFORE drawing any conclusions from the change in the fundamental character of American foreign policy, a second great development in the history of that policy must be examined.

As the Monroe Doctrine charted a course for governmental relationships with Europe and Latin-America, so the Open Door Manifesto defined these for the Far East. Together, the Open Door and the Monroe Doctrine go far towards telling the entire story of American foreign policy, up to the outbreak of the first World War.

Like the Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door Manifesto was promulgated with British support, in order to block imperialistic expansion, in this case at Chinese expense, on the part of non-British powers, particularly Russia. In backing American opposition to conquests by others, however, the British in both cases were careful to hold on to what they had won for themselves.

The Open Door policy means much more than those words alone imply. In addition to demanding full equality with other nations for American commercial interests, it also crystallized American support of Chinese political independence and territorial integrity. Actual establish-

ment of this policy took the form of parallel diplomatic notes, over the signature of John Hay as Secretary of State, dispatched to the British, French, German, Japanese and Russian governments, on September 6, 1899. The date is important.

Exactly seven months earlier, after heated debate and in the face of a determined opposition led by Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, the Senate had ratified the Treaty of Peace with Spain, with just one vote more than the requisite two-thirds majority. Hostility to annexation of the Philippines was the basis of the opposition, which would probably have won against the expansionist leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge except for the challenge to American pride given by the Filipino insurrection. T. R. thanked the Filipinos for having "pulled the treaty through for us."⁷

The United States had annexed Hawaii, at the request of its legislature and by joint resolution of Congress, on August 12, 1898. By the immediately subsequent acquisition of the Philippines, the McKinley Administration was in a position to make its influence felt on the Asiatic mainland. And it so happened that the British Government, worried by the Russian penetration of Manchuria, facing vigorous German rivalry everywhere, and moving into the Boer War, was then greatly in need of American good will.

After the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, Canning had reported to the House of Commons that he "called the New World into existence to redress the

⁷ Cf. A. Whitney Griswold: *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company; 1938), Ch. I.

balance of the Old.”⁸ At the end of the Nineteenth Century, maintenance of the balance of power by Britain demanded similar co-operation from the United States in the Far East.

Therefore, in a speech to his constituents at Birmingham, May 13, 1898, Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, “virtually took the stump for an Anglo-American alliance.”⁹ John Hay, then our Ambassador in London, responded in kind. The British officially declared themselves, by policy and tradition, favorable to freedom of trade in China. So the road for Anglo-American co-operation in the Far East had been both surveyed and carefully mapped when Hay, after becoming Secretary of State, dispatched the famous circular note.

The essence of this manifesto was the flat assertion that “the Government of the United States will in no way commit itself to any recognition of the exclusive rights of any Power within or control over any portion of the Chinese Empire . . .” And the note further urged, as necessary for the preservation of an “open market” in China, “declarations by the various Powers claiming ‘spheres of interest’ in China as to their intentions in regard to the treatment of foreign trade and commerce therein . . .”¹

In the words of the expert analysis made by Dr. Willoughby, all of the replies excepting that of Russia, “substantially accepted Secretary Hay’s proposal”. Wil-

⁸ Speech of December 12, 1826.

⁹ Griswold, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹ Text from Westel Woodbury Willoughby: *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; 1927), Vol. I, pp. 68-69.

loughby adds: "The Russian reply, however, distinctly failed to commit the Russian Government to the exact propositions made by Secretary Hay."²

The following summer (1900) the Boxer rising flared up throughout China. Many foreigners were killed, and, from June 13 to August 14, the Legation Quarter in Peking was besieged. Nevertheless, on July 3, the United States reaffirmed its interest in the Open Door and the protection of Chinese sovereignty. In a circular telegram to all governments having treaty relations with China, Secretary Hay then said:

"The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution [of the existing troubles] which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."³

5.

OVER PROTRACTED Japanese objection, the policy of defending China from aggression was reaffirmed by the Washington treaties of 1922. One of the most significant results of these was to terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. As seen by a famous British Foreign Minister, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, this alliance had be-

² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

come "a matter of some embarrassment and even of anxiety" to Britain, because: "We dared not risk offending the United States."⁴

Therefore the British agreed to scrap this balance of power alliance, the more readily because it had been originally directed against Russia, which in 1922 seemed impotent. In place of the London-Tokyo alliance was substituted an Anglo-American working agreement in the Far East. Its anti-Japanese alignment was well illustrated by the 5-5-3 ratio in capital ships agreed upon for the United States, Britain and Japan respectively.

The manner in which Japan was then out-maneuvered by American diplomacy; the consequent resentment that led to the ascendancy of the Japanese military extremists, their repudiation of the Open Door and, finally, the attack on Pearl Harbor, are chapters of recent and generally familiar history. Underlying the American opposition to Japanese expansion throughout was both a general opposition to aggression as such and a particular desire to counter it in the Far East. This desire led naturally to strong support of Nationalist China, as symbolized by its dynamic leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

From the domestic viewpoint, this Far Eastern policy was logical, popular and wholly non-partisan. Its implications were made clear by Republican Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, on January 7, 1932, in a declaration that the United States would not recognize the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. This doctrine of non-recognition was carried to its logical conclusion a decade later by

⁴ Edward G. Grey of Fallodon: *Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916* (New York: F. A. Stokes Company; 1925), Vol. II, pp. 103-4.

Secretary Hull's note of November 26, 1941, to Tokyo. Recognized by our military leaders as the quasi-ultimatum that produced Pearl Harbor, this note demanded that Japan "give up all extra-territorial rights in China" and deal there only with the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

It was further due to President F. D. Roosevelt's insistence that Nationalist China was given "Great Power" recognition and awarded one of the five privileged seats on the Council of U.N.⁵

The consistency of this background of support for China's political integrity is what made the sell-out of China to Russia at the Yalta Conference such an extraordinary and revolting action. That personal secret agreement of February 11, 1945, made by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, approved all of the earlier Russian encroachments on China, and more, to be confirmed under American pressure by the Sino-Soviet Treaty signed in Moscow on August 14, 1945.

Moreover, this was a treacherous deal, because made behind the back of our Chinese ally, something which the State Department itself later called "unfortunate".⁶ At one secret stroke a dying American President destroyed the entire structure of friendship with China, and with it the Open Door as a pillar of American foreign policy. Across the ruins, Communism moved in swiftly.

But the Administration that fell heir to the personal diplomacy of Mr. Roosevelt would not admit the blun-

⁵ Cf. Department of State Publication 3573: "United States Relations With China", p. 37.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

der, as shown by the following colloquy on Yalta, at the Senate investigation of the MacArthur dismissal, June 4, 1951:

SECRETARY ACHESON: "Russian participation or intervention in Manchuria was something which nobody had any power to prevent. . . . It was much better to have it take place when it could do our fighting effort some good than to have it take place after that effort was over and we had suffered severe losses."

SENATOR SMITH (N.J.): "Do you think that is a justification for our having made a secret agreement that in effect legalized the theft of parts of China and interests in China from the Chinese without their knowing anything about it or without their being represented and keeping it from them until the Russians had moved into Manchuria?"

SECRETARY ACHESON: "That was the reason why it was done. Looking at it in the light of what was known at that time, I doubt very much whether anyone in this room would have disagreed with it."

SENATOR SMITH: "I can't help but feel that it would have been very difficult for me to have undercut an ally in that way, and then keep the matter secret from the ally." ⁷

As the facts gradually leaked out, the morally indefensible betrayal of China by the United States aroused widespread apprehension among the American people, both as to the quality and as to the real objectives of American foreign policy. Administration efforts to excuse and palliate the Yalta blunder served only to intensify confusion. To assert that the sudden and complete reversal of the long-established Far Eastern policy was


⁷ *New York Times*, June 5, 1951.

justified was also to say, by implication, that the policy reversed was fundamentally faulty, that to fight a war with Japan in behalf of Chinese nationalism had been a dreadful mistake.



VIII

The Era of Acceptance



IT IS, TO REPEAT, UNJUSTIFIABLE TO DEFINE A NATIONAL foreign policy, at any given moment, as either "good" or "evil". These absolute human standards are simply not applicable to "the governmental conduct of the relations of one sovereignty to others in a world of conflicting states." One does not say that the policy of a Post Office Department is right or wrong and moral criteria are even less appropriate in the case of a Foreign Office.

There are, however, more mundane standards by which the conduct of a Foreign Office can be measured, and must be measured in any country where the responsibility of the governors to the governed is explicit, as under the Constitution of the United States. It can and should be asked whether the foreign policy is *legal*, meaning does it comply with constitutional requirements. Further important questions are: is foreign policy *efficient*, in its necessarily continuous endeavor to obtain national security? Is it *economical*, in attaining that objective at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer? Is it *logical*, in the sense of having continuity of purpose and presenting a comprehensible pattern to which all aspects of the policy conform? Is it *popular*, meaning does the policy respond to, or at least not actively violate, the instincts of the people? At that point ethics does enter

the foreign policy picture, as an influence that is naturally most pronounced under representative government.

In applying these criteria to the post-war foreign policy of the United States it is necessary to bear in mind the principles that controlled prior to the war. To assist understanding of the evolution of American foreign policy, the major historical landmarks have been recalled. Of course this review is only a fragment of the entire diplomatic history of the United States. But the part selected gives, it is believed, an accurate idea of the whole.

More extended analysis would only confirm the evidence that American foreign policy until the war with Spain was predominantly negative. The isolationist attitude that controlled during the early days of the Republic has maintained almost surprising strength as the small agrarian nation consolidated, expanded, and became the greatest industrial empire the world has ever seen. The organ of central government assigned to conduct negotiations with other sovereignties was originally called the Department of State in part because of popular mistrust of "foreign affairs." It is not merely inertia that keeps this inappropriate nomenclature. More votes would probably be lost than gained, by any Administration that formally proposed an outright "Foreign Office."

Nevertheless, the government of the United States has from the outset been engaged in complicated and often delicate negotiations with other governments. In spite of its fortunate geographic location, in the days of sail, the security of the Republic from external pressures could never be taken for granted. Consequently American diplomacy has always had a positive content, in spite of its

predominantly negative character. It has also, until recent times, been continuously subject to popular criticism, often ill-informed and sometimes spiteful, yet on the whole successful in that major decisions made in the face of opposition have always received subsequent popular support.

2.

THE POSITIVE content of American foreign policy, since the War of 1812, has taken the form of a continuous working agreement with Great Britain, natural because of the strength of the English cultural heritage in this country; natural also because of very important economic ties and because the long northern frontier of the Republic marches with a great British Dominion which has strongly and beneficially influenced Anglo-American relations. It has further been natural for Americans to favor the British Empire above any other, for after all it was that Empire which laid the groundwork for the United States.

Continuously, however, the American people have also been affected by a heritage of antipathy as well as one of admiration for the "Mother Country". The Federal form of government adopted here was, with its balanced powers, fundamentally different from that of England. In spite of a common language the type of civilization that was developed, even before the Revolution, had far more

variation from than kinship with the English social pattern. For "patriotic" reasons, ancient grievances have been kept alive, and even grossly exaggerated, in American schools. Irish and German loyalties, often antagonistic to Britain, have played a considerable part.

As a result of this interplay of forces Anglo-American relationships long remained a mere collaborative arrangement, far less formal in character than that legal alliance which would have been anathema to the original, self-reliant American political creed. Many aspects of British foreign policy have always been viewed with mistrust, whether or not justifiably so, by the American public as a whole. And it was not until Britain's world position was seriously threatened—in 1917—that the United States went to war as an ally, even then maintaining rather fatuously that we were merely an "associated power".

There is no doubt that World War I was one of the great divides of history. Among other effects it terminated the British balance of power system. In place of this, under American leadership, was developed the theory of "collective security". A resurgence of isolationism—the natural swing of the political pendulum—then kept the United States out of the League of Nations, although this was the instrumentality designed to develop collective security. So it came to be reasoned by interventionist Americans that the League failed because of United States abstention.

This conclusion was necessarily hypothetical, with as much evidence con as pro. But it unquestionably strengthened the national resolve to build a second League of Nations, centered around American participa-

tion, at the close of World War II. To accomplish this purpose it seemed desirable to silence all proponents of the traditional isolationist attitude, a dubious procedure which could be made to seem laudable because those with isolationist leanings were for that very reason skeptics about the constructive accomplishments of the war. Anxiety over this skepticism, even when repressed, helps to account for the mystical, indeed almost hysterical, faith in the United Nations as a panacea.

The net result of this emotional yearning was to throw all practical diplomatic considerations to the wind during and immediately after the course of the hostilities. On the bland assumption that U.N. was destined to bring perpetual peace the United States committed a whole series of colossal blunders, over and above that of Yalta. Outstanding items in the series were:

(1) The failure to take any precautions against the obvious long-range designs of the Russian Communist Government, in spite of numerous frank official Russian statements as to the actual character of Moscow's post-war aims.

(2) The insistence on the "unconditional surrender" of Germany, creating a political vacuum for Communism to fill, and nullifying all the constructive effort of the many German leaders who so courageously sponsored the non-Communist anti-Nazi movement.

(3) The arrangement to let Russia occupy the great Central European industrial centers of Silesia, Saxony and Bohemia, placing their equipment, skilled workmen and scientific personnel under Communist control.

(4) The decision to isolate both Berlin and Vienna

from any land contact with the Western occupation zones.

(5) The Morgenthau Plan for reducing Western Germany to pastoral status, implemented by the dismantling of its steel, chemical, aluminum, electrical, shipbuilding, watchmaking and other industries—a program of planned destruction which played directly into Russian hands.

(6) The ban on restoration of the Japanese merchant marine, and the doctrinaire fragmentation of that nation's economy, which with Japan's territorial losses insured pauperism for the overcrowded islands. It is now known that except for General MacArthur's enlightened attitude, the post-war destruction of the Japanese economy would have been carried to even greater lengths.

(7) The "permission" given Russia to occupy and communize Korea down to the 38th Parallel, in addition to all the advantages given the Kremlin at Yalta and in return for less than one week of Russian military help against Japan.

Such a series of foreign policy blunders would have been far less likely if Congress had asserted its prerogative in this field, or even if there had been frank and open public discussion of issues as they arose. But the theory that all criticism should be stifled, that "papa knows best", held almost undisputed sway.

3.

DURING THE WAR against the Axis, any forthright criticism of President Roosevelt's personal diplomacy was probably too much to expect. The European struggle was successfully depicted as one in which the very existence of the United States was at stake. Today most Americans would agree that this was gross exaggeration. By comparison with Soviet Russia's admitted objectives the most audacious territorial ambitions of Hitler, Mussolini and even Tojo in retrospect seem almost modest. There is no documentary evidence that any of these three ever had any designs of conquest in either North or South America.

Some thoughtful Americans, prior to Pearl Harbor, risked contumely, insult and well-organized defamation to point out that the traditional interests of their Republic lay in observing strict neutrality between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. As Herbert Hoover said on June 29, 1941, war between these equally vicious dictatorships indicated their mutual enfeeblement to the stage where both:

" . . . will be sufficiently exhausted to listen to the military, economic and moral powers of the United States and at that moment and that moment only can the United States promote a just and lasting peace."

Such a policy of armed and watchful waiting would then have upheld every historical tenet of American for-

eign policy. We could have fed and supplied Great Britain, under the doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas. We could have aided Chiang Kai-shek and upheld the Open Door against Japanese pressure perhaps more successfully by reason of being neutral in Continental Europe. If necessary to save the British Empire, we could have fought Japan alone, as Russia cannily fought Germany alone until Japan was on the verge of surrender.

Such a policy was indeed implied by the Monroe Doctrine, the reciprocal nature of which has already been emphasized. Only the American pledge not to intervene in European quarrels had justified the warning to European Powers against intervention on the American Continent.

But all that is now water over the dam. The fact is that the nation as a whole willingly accepted the personal diplomacy of President Roosevelt. Indeed there is evidence to show that this President did not, at the outset of the war, wish to accept the *carte blanche* in the conduct of foreign policy extended to him. If there was executive usurpation of power it was certainly made easy by the general impairment and supine surrender of the national critical faculty.

Less than two months after the speech by Mr. Hoover quoted above, on August 12, 1941, in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in behalf of their respective governments signed the declaration that came to be known as the Atlantic Charter. That was, in effect, both a proclamation of Anglo-American alliance and an American declaration of war against Germany, although under the

Constitution of the United States not binding on this country in either respect without Congressional approval.

Winston Churchill's memoirs of World War II provide what must be regarded as an authoritative account of this extraordinary action. The British Prime Minister tells¹ of the first suggestion for the meeting, from Harry Hopkins "in late July." Mr. Churchill then reveals that he and not Mr. Roosevelt drafted the declaration, saying: "I am glad it should be of record that the substance and spirit of what came to be called the Atlantic Charter was in its first draft a British production cast in my own words." He tells how he prevailed on Mr. Roosevelt to make "commitments" that no American President had the Constitutional right to undertake. Then, in a characteristically cutting phrase, Churchill concludes:

"The fact alone of the United States, still technically neutral, joining with a belligerent Power in making such a declaration was astonishing."

Yet the decline of the American critical faculty had gone so far that only a small minority of our native commentators saw anything "astonishing" in what immediately impressed an English politician as such.

¹ Winston Churchill: *The Grand Alliance* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company; 1950), pp. 427-444.

4.

IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED that President Roosevelt himself did not anticipate that Congress would so readily abdicate its Constitutional right and responsibility to check and supervise the course of foreign policy.

Winston Churchill says that in the discussions of his draft Atlantic Charter, Mr. Roosevelt at first spoke for something much less formal and far-reaching. "The President explained that his idea was . . . a short statement to the effect that . . . these naval and military conversations had in no way been concerned with future commitments other than as authorized by Act of Congress."²

Although Mr. Roosevelt let himself be persuaded into overstepping his prerogative at Placentia Bay he later demonstrated on several occasions that he was not unaware of the Constitutional limits on his executive power.

On December 8, 1941, the day after Pearl Harbor, Mr. Roosevelt "arose at dawn" to complete his message to Congress asking for a declaration of war against Japan. That brief statement, delivered to a joint session of both Houses, could be subject to no criticism from the viewpoint of legality. The President reported that "As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense." He said: "hostilities exist". But, in strict conformity with Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution Mr. Roosevelt concluded:

² *Ibid.*, p. 436.

"I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday December 7th, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire."

Similarly, two years later, Mr. Roosevelt made clear that in his mind the Cairo Declaration, of December 1, 1943, was for the United States merely a statement of executive intent, having no binding force unless and until embodied in a treaty of peace, which of course requires Senate ratification. At Cairo it was agreed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek that all territory "stolen" from China by Japan, including Manchuria and Formosa, would be restored to the Nationalist Chinese Government. It was further declared at Cairo that: "In due course, Korea shall become free and independent."

These executive arrangements were wholly within the framework of the Open Door and our traditional Far Eastern policy. As such they would doubtless have received hearty Congressional support. But the President properly did not take this for granted. He did not suggest that the political agreements made at Cairo, and immediately afterwards with Stalin at Teheran, were anything more than provisional and tentative.

On the contrary, reporting to Congress on January 11, 1944, Mr. Roosevelt assured the Senate that it would have the last word as to both Cairo and Teheran. The President then said he was "thoroughly conversant with the provisions of our Constitution." He said that, in his capacity as Commander in Chief, he had certainly made "very large and very specific military plans." Immedi-

ately he added: "But there were no secret treaties or political or financial commitments."

Indeed the complete fluidity of the Cairo Declaration, in its political aspects, was painfully emphasized by President Roosevelt himself at Yalta, little more than a year later. By this executive agreement of February 11, 1945, with no Chinese representative present, Soviet Russia was given certain "pre-eminent" rights in Mongolia and Manchuria. This greatly weakened the prestige of the Chinese Nationalists, who at Cairo had been given assurance of the restoration of Manchuria with no strings attached. Furthermore, as already noted, the Yalta Agreement was completely at variance with the Open Door policy. It transferred to Russia, without Chinese knowledge, the same special privileges on Chinese soil that we had resisted when they were exacted by Japan.

Nevertheless, President Roosevelt knew that the political arrangements made "by me" at Yalta were *ultra vires* and he was clearly worried about it when he reported on some—by no means all—of the deal in his last message to Congress, on March 1, 1945. He said: "Unless you here in the halls of the American Congress—with the support of the American people—concur in the decisions reached at Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results."

And then, a little later in the same message: "As you know, I have always been a believer in the document called the Constitution of the United States . . . I am well aware of the Constitutional fact" that political arrangements made at Yalta "must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate of the United States."

But this scrapping of the Open Door policy has never been approved by, or even submitted to, the Senate. It stands on the books as irrefutable evidence of the surrender of control over the conduct of their foreign policy by the people of the United States. And the record further shows that this surrender went far beyond the expectation of a President who had few inhibitions about the usurpation of power.

5.

WITH THE DEATH of President Roosevelt, and the immediately subsequent collapse first of German and then of Japanese military resistance, the Department of State was confronted with an unprecedented and highly disconcerting situation. We had won the war. But not even those in nominal charge of foreign policy knew about all the mortgages held by the Kremlin.

A major part of the responsibility for auditing the books fell on James F. Byrnes, who was appointed Secretary of State, succeeding Edward R. Stettinius, on July 3, 1945. "Jimmy" Byrnes had been at Yalta, as an adviser to President Roosevelt, but as he has wryly written: "It was not until some time after I became Secretary of State that a news story from Moscow caused me to inquire and learn of the full agreement." He simply did not know "how many IOU's were outstanding."³

³ James F. Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers; 1947), p. 43.

At the Potsdam Conference, convened immediately after the Byrnes appointment, both the magnitude of Mr. Roosevelt's personal commitments, and the intention of Stalin to hold the United States to full accountability for them, began to be apparent. One way to confront the awkward situation, of which the American people were almost wholly unaware, was to conceal it so far as possible under the cloak of a "bipartisan foreign policy".

Such a policy had been taken for granted during the war. Because of the nature of the aftermath it seemed essential to prevent any outbreak of pent-up criticism from Congress. As former Senators, both President Truman and Secretary Byrnes were well qualified to appeal for Congressional tolerance and support. In this connection a particular play was made to Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Byrnes also put through the appointment of Senator Warren R. Austin, Vermont Republican, as head of the American delegation to the newly-formed United Nations.

As an opiate, the bipartisan policy worked well. It was for some time successful in preventing any serious Republican criticism, or any real public understanding, of the very uncomfortable post-war position of the United States. Senator Vandenberg did plaintively observe that a bipartisan foreign policy "should participate in the take-offs as well as the crash landings". The first serious rift in the lute, however, came not from the opposition, but from a fellow Cabinet member of Secretary Byrnes. On September 12, 1946, at Madison Square Garden, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace attacked Mr. Byrnes

as not being sufficiently conciliatory to the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter Mr. Wallace left the Cabinet.

Mr. Byrnes himself withdrew as Secretary of State on January 20, 1947 and was succeeded in that office by General George C. Marshall, who had then just returned from his assignment as special representative of the President to China. In that capacity General Marshall had implemented the policy of undermining Chiang Kai-shek, as initiated in the Far East Division of the Department of State.

6.

IN HIS revealing memoirs, *Speaking Frankly*, former Secretary Byrnes gives background on the unsuccessful Marshall Mission. He says:

"Before Ambassador Hurley's resignation, the State Department had prepared a statement of policy on China, the first draft of which I showed the Ambassador a few days before he resigned. As soon as President Truman appointed General Marshall his personal representative in China, I asked the General to study the draft so that he could help prepare the final statement for presentation to the President."⁴

Mr. Byrnes then tells of the agreement reached by himself, Under Secretary Acheson and General Marshall

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 226. Cf. also Freda Utley: *The China Story* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company; 1951), Ch. I.

“upon the statement of policy that subsequently was approved by the President and released to the public on December 15 [1945]. Thereafter the President made no change in that policy except upon the recommendation of General Marshall or with his approval.”

In this “statement of policy”, drafted in the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State, President Truman said: “The United States . . . believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country.”

Foremost among these “other political elements” were the Chinese Communists. Chiang Kai-shek was pressured by the United States to co-operate with them at the same time that the French and Italian governments were expelling Communists from their Cabinets. The Chinese Nationalists might well have been overthrown by the Reds in any case. But the Chiang Kai-shek regime was the more completely demoralized by the strange American requirement that it form a virtual partnership with Moscow as a condition of continued assistance from the United States.

Criticism of the State Department’s pro-Communist policy in China was for a time met with vague rebuttal about a “China Lobby”. But the evidence was too glaring to be suppressed by this or other counter-charges concerning real or alleged corruption in the entourage of the Nationalist Generalissimo. Bipartisanship could not stand the mounting strain, as was demonstrated when four Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee,⁵ on August 13, 1950, issued a statement asserting that: "Our Far Eastern Policy . . . consistently temporized with and capitulated to the ruthless demands of the Communists, dominated by Moscow. . . . This was never a bipartisan policy. It was solely an Administration policy."

A year prior to this political rupture the Department of State had sought to avert it by issuing, in August, 1949, a comprehensive "White Book" on the relations of the United States with China. The letter of transmittal to President Truman was signed by Dean Acheson, who had succeeded General Marshall as Secretary of State in January of 1949. Mr. Acheson's letter concluded with the statement that the Far Eastern policy of the United States "will continue to be based upon . . . our traditional support for the Open Door and for China's independence and administrative and territorial integrity."

By August, 1949, however, it was no longer possible to conceal the fact that the Open Door policy had been scrapped at Yalta and that the Chinese "agrarian reformers" were in close co-operation with Moscow. If further evidence were needed the White Paper provided it by giving documentation⁶ on the State Department's complete failure to get any formal assurances from Stalin "affirming respect for the Open Door policy".

In retrospect it can be seen that this White Paper—or the black background which the document at least

⁵ Wiley, Alexander Smith, Hickenlooper, and Lodge. Senator Vandenberg, though absent because of illness, recorded himself "in general agreement."

⁶ Pp. 118–20.

partially revealed—really broke the log-jam previously maintained by the “bipartisan” foreign policy. From coast to coast a chorus of protest welled up against the Administration’s obvious animus towards Chiang Kai-shek, its open encouragement to the Chinese Communists; its seeming indifference to the fate of Formosa and Korea.

The known facts inevitably encouraged rumors exaggerating actual evidence as to Communist infiltration of the Department of State and other key governmental agencies. Then open aggression across the 38th Parallel by well-armed North Korean Communists, on June 25, 1950, forced the Administration to change its policy overnight, to take the lead in invoking collective action by the United Nations in Korea, and independently to defend in Formosa the remnants of the Chiang regime that it had been vociferously denouncing as both “reactionary” and “corrupt”.⁷

The unforeseen consequences of the Yalta Agreement strengthened opposition to Administration candidates in the 1950 Congressional elections and thereby helped to bring the tragic era of bipartisan foreign policy to an end.

⁷ For documentation, v. *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis*, Dept. of State Publication No. 3922.

The Rise of the Department of State

THE CONDITION OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY MAKES IT natural for the control of all official contacts between governments to be concentrated in one responsible agency. In every state a single voice must dominate in the negotiating and making of agreements with others.

That situation, however, is one that automatically tends to increase the power of the executive. And it follows that the more numerous the official contacts of any one government with others, the greater will be the tendency for the executive to become dictatorial—towards its own subjects rather than towards the foreigners with whose spokesmen contracts of various kinds are being continuously made.

Thus we have the political paradox, first observed by Plato, that the more numerous the international contacts of a democratic government, the more likely it is to be transformed into a dictatorship. Applying the Platonic reasoning to the American scene the great French political scientist, Alexis de Tocqueville, in Andrew Jackson's day expressed grave apprehension as to the future of American democracy. "The older a democratic community", he said, "the more centralized will its government become."¹

¹ Alexis de Tocqueville: *Democracy in America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1945), Vol. II, p. 294n.

The founders of the American Republic were as well-informed and far-sighted a group of political thinkers as have ever been assembled at one time and place. They realized, as every student of *The Federalist* knows, that the problem of control over foreign policy was one of the most difficult with which they had to grapple in drafting the Constitution. And their anxieties were sharpened by the realization that this country was destined to become one of the most powerful on earth. Benjamin Franklin in 1751 predicted that the American population "will in another century be more than the people of England." James Madison overshot the mark somewhat by estimating, in 1787, that a census of the United States in 1930 would count 192,000,000 inhabitants.²

Therefore, to safeguard and insure perpetuity for the Republic they were establishing, the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 created a duality of authority over foreign affairs, over and above the general separation of executive and legislative power. The direction of the foreign policy of the United States was made an executive function, but with more and sharper qualifications than are imposed on most modern governments. One voice would speak, but with provision for contradiction in case of arrogance.

These legal limitations on the executive control of American foreign policy will be considered in due course. But their import becomes more clear after examination of the actual development and functioning of the Department of State, established after some fumbling by the

² *The Madison Papers* (Mobile: Allston Mygatt; 1842), Vol. III, Appendix 4.

first Congress of the United States, in legislation approved by President Washington on September 15, 1789. For this department, in spite of its incongruous name, is the executive office to which the conduct of foreign policy has been entrusted since the adoption of the Constitution.

2.

DOWN TO and including Dean Gooderham Acheson there have been 51 Secretaries of State, not counting those who have acted in that capacity, from a few days to a few months, without formal appointment and requisite Senatorial approval. The first of this long line, who like the latest had many troubles in that office, was Thomas Jefferson. In addition to the conduct of foreign relations this Secretary was at first given responsibility for the Mint, the Patent Office, the deposit of copyrights and the conduct of the census.

Despite these multifarious duties, which of course were all embryonic in Jefferson's day, the first Secretary of State ran the new department with a frugality never mentioned at contemporary party dinners in his honor. His initial staff consisted of five clerks, one interpreter and two messengers. Jefferson's first budget for one year's expenses of the department, drawn up in June, 1790, amounted to \$7961, counting his own salary of \$3500 but excluding the cost of the very small foreign service. A

decade later, when John Marshall resigned as Secretary to become Chief Justice, the personnel of the Department of State, then established in Washington, numbered only ten, with an annual salary outlay of \$11,500.³

Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, J. Q. Adams, Van Buren and Buchanan, respectively the first, fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth and seventeenth to hold office as Secretary of State, went on in each case to occupy the White House. No Secretary of State has done so since the Civil War. But this early tendency of movement to the Presidency shows that the responsibility for foreign policy was taken very seriously by the electorate of those days. There is further evidence in the high calibre of the men usually chosen for the first American diplomatic missions abroad.

If Jefferson had gone direct from the State Department to the White House, and if Edmund Randolph and Timothy Pickering, the second and third Secretaries of State had been more successful in that office, a precedent of great moment in American politics might easily have been established.

However, the resignation of Randolph under unfortunate circumstances, and the actual dismissal of Pickering,⁴ served strongly to emphasize the subordination of the Secretary of State to the President. While various Chief Executives have often allowed their Secretaries great latitude in the conduct of foreign policy, and while many

³ Graham H. Stuart: *The Department of State* (New York: The Macmillan Company; 1949), p. 36. That comprehensive history has been extensively used in the summarization of this and the following chapter.

⁴ The circumstances are conveniently summarized in Stuart, *op. cit.* pp. 27-33.

very able men have headed the Department of State, in times of crisis the President has always called the turn.

In fact, as well as in theory, every President "is ultimately responsible to the American people for the formulation, execution and co-ordination of foreign policies."⁵ As it came to be realized that the Secretary of State is politically an understudy for the President it also became less likely that the Secretary would receive the party nomination. Furthermore, reluctance towards active participation in domestic politics soon began to develop among these foreign ministers themselves.

The internal organization of the Department did not keep pace with its increasing duties and responsibilities. After John Quincy Adams accepted the nomination of Secretary from President Monroe, in 1817, he protested that he found "all in disorder and confusion"⁶ in the State Department, a complaint echoed by many who have filled the position since. This secretary, however, proceeded to do something about it.

Without any typewriters or modern office equipment, with responsibility not only for foreign policy but also for conducting the 1820 Census, for standardizing weights and measures and other extraneous duties, with only a handful of employes and a farcical budget, Adams was nevertheless able to reorganize his important office into a high state of efficiency. Simultaneously he did much of the diplomatic spadework for the Monroe Doctrine and other important policy measures. Professor

⁵ Report of the [Hoover] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government: *Foreign Affairs*, p. 10.

⁶ *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, Charles F. Adams, editor (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott and Company, 1875), Vol. IV, p. 100.

Stuart, reviewing the entire galaxy of Secretaries up to Acheson, defines John Quincy Adams as "the Department's greatest". So it is the more interesting to recall the political philosophy of this indefatigable worker, who believed that "the more of pure moral principle is carried into policy and conduct of a government, the wiser and more profound will that policy be."⁷ Only an ethical foreign policy, thought Adams, can be successful.

3.

SENATOR HENRY CABOT LODGE, in his biography of Daniel Webster, placed that Secretary of State second only to John Quincy Adams as a successful administrator. Certainly Webster's staunch isolationism, his refusal to consider the seizure of Hawaii and his insistence on non-intervention as a fundamental principle, helped greatly to delay the development of American imperialism. Webster had to be removed before the United States could annex Texas and wage aggressive war against Mexico. He is also notable for having returned to this secretaryship seven years after his resignation, dying in office during the second term.

Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun are among the other notable early Secretaries of State, though in these cases perhaps less distinguished in that office than as Senators. But an effort to appraise the functioning of the Depart-

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 47.

ment, rather than merely to catalog its various executives, may properly jump to Hamilton Fish, still remembered for his administrative as well as his diplomatic skill.

Fish was Secretary of State through both terms of President U. S. Grant. The record of the two men in their respective offices confirms the not wholly reliable belief that a strong man in the White House means a weak Secretary, and vice versa. Certainly few State Department heads have ever chided their chiefs more witheringly than in the words used by Fish to Grant when the latter proposed to make a quartermaster general Minister to Moscow, because allegedly unsatisfactory in his army post. "Pardon me, my dear General," wrote Fish, "should I seem a little sensitive in respect to having one who is held to be unfit to discharge the duties of a Bureau in the War Department [held] as competent to discharge the most important diplomatic duties under the Department of State." ⁸

While Fish tacitly backed the Senate, in its successful fight to keep Grant from annexing Santo Domingo, and simultaneously smoothed the ruffled Senators who wanted the British to pay upwards of \$2,000,000,000 to settle the *Alabama* claims, an equally vital achievement was in careful reorganization of the State Department.

Congress "had reduced the number of clerks from 48 to 31 for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1869." ⁹ Even so, or perhaps because of the economy pressure, Fish divided the departmental work among bureaus in a system

⁸ Quoted, Allan Nevins, *Hamilton Fish* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company; 1936), p. 727.

⁹ Stuart, *op. cit.* p. 142.

that remained essentially unchanged until 1909. He also expedited routine operations in many ways and made the employes strictly observe the working hours of 9:30 to 4:00, with half an hour for lunch.

Secretaries of State have frequently compiled tabulations for Congress on the astronomical hours of "overtime" worked in that department. Few have been as frank as Hamilton Fish in pointing out that working conditions there are unusually pleasant and that a six-hour day was normal in the State Department as far back as 1870. When John Hay became Secretary, in 1898: "He went to work at 10:30 but couldn't catch up, and therefore decided to start at 9:30 . . . with his hours from 9:30 to 5:00, he declared that he was disgustingly busy and expected conditions to be worse when Congress met."¹

Nevertheless Hay, the architect of the Open Door, was a hard-working as well as superlatively able Secretary of State, who died in harness. Appointed by President McKinley he came, as have several other Secretaries, to Cabinet office direct from the Court of St. James. Hay, who was throughout pronouncedly Anglophile, did not get on too well with the Senate, yet secured the ratification of 15 treaties in his seven years of office. Moreover, he never asserted the need of lavish appropriations and a horde of employes for his accomplishment.

"There were 82 on the payroll of the Department when he entered in 1898 and 119 when Root took office. The cost of the Department had increased from \$135,000 in 1898 to \$191,000 in 1905."²

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

4.

THE PLAN of geographical divisions, under expert diplomatic administration, was first proposed during Elihu Root's tenure of the State Department but was not made really effective until after Philander C. Knox became Secretary, with Root's blessing, as President Taft's appointee.

Western European, Near Eastern, Far Eastern and Latin-American divisions were then established, with each geopolitical section under a career diplomat as chief of division. The office of Counsellor was created, to centralize and more efficiently handle the important and growing legal work of the department. A Division of Information was added, with what was then regarded as the extravagant staff of six. Existing bureaus were overhauled and even expanded, so that by the end of 1909 the Department of State, excluding foreign service officers, had the unprecedented number of 210 employes on its payroll.³ Thus it stood when the Democrats came into power, after sixteen years of exile, and William Jennings Bryan was named by Woodrow Wilson as Secretary of State.

Over the years, somewhat fitfully and with setbacks, the theory of a career service in American diplomacy had gained ground. The establishment of four geopolitical divisions, guided by experts on those areas, had been its formal recognition. Civil service regulations protected

³ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

the clerical workers. That very fact, however, made political pressure for the professional jobs the stronger. Secretary Bryan did very little to resist that pressure, and even coined the classic phrase "deserving Democrats", in his famous letter to the new Receiver General of Customs at Santo Domingo:

"Now that you have arrived and acquainted yourself with the situation, can you let me know what positions you have at your disposal with which to reward deserving Democrats? Whenever you desire a suggestion from me in regard to a man for a place down there, call on me. You know . . . how difficult it is to find suitable rewards for the deserving. . . . You will find Sullivan a strong, courageous, reliable fellow." ⁴

The Sullivan referred to was James M., a New York "police court lawyer" who was appointed by Bryan as Minister to Santo Domingo, replacing a career officer of eighteen years' standing (William W. Russell). The American grip on this nominally independent Caribbean republic made diplomatic appointment there a profitable and convenient "reward for the deserving", as Secretary Bryan put it.

In 1900, John Hay had written caustically that co-operation with Great Britain was made difficult for him "because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools." ⁵ Various Democratic Presidents have seemingly sought to support at least that part of the observation bearing on the politicians of Irish descent. Wilson named Sullivan Minister to Santo Domingo. In 1943,

⁴ Quoted, Stuart, *op. cit.* p. 229.

⁵ Letter to John W. Foster, quoted by Stuart, *op. cit.* p. 197.

Roosevelt named Edward J. ("paving blocks") Flynn as Minister to Australia, to replace career officer Nelson T. Johnson. The Senate would not confirm this weird appointment, which did not keep President Truman from naming ex-Mayor O'Dwyer of New York as Ambassador to Mexico in 1951.

Woodrow Wilson was not happy about the secretaryship of Mr. Bryan, admittedly appointed as a political obligation. The career personnel of the State Department were not happy either, for Bryan in his first six months of office replaced more than half of the chiefs of diplomatic missions with utterly untrained party henchmen.

The consequent deterioration in State Department morale was used as illogical justification for a Wilsonian innovation of very dubious import—the utilization of private Presidential agents, instead of responsible diplomatic officers, to formulate American foreign policy. The curious fatality that seems to plunge the United States into war under Democratic Presidents also plays a part here, because in wartime there is naturally less public and Congressional criticism of the executive conduct of foreign policy.

5.

THE DOMINATION of Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy by his "silent partner" Edward M. House can be impartially examined in Charles Seymour's revealing com-

pilation.⁶ Here we merely note that the precedent set in this case was followed by President Roosevelt with Harry Hopkins, to mention only the outstanding member of that Chief Executive's corps of private diplomatic agents, and by President Truman with W. Averell Harriman, whose extra-departmental position became formalized as "foreign affairs advisor" to the President, which of course is what the Secretary of State himself is supposed to be.

How far this trend has gone was well illustrated by an editorial entitled "Impasse in Iran" in the *Washington Post* of July 7, 1951. After paying somewhat perfunctory tribute to the experienced American Ambassador, Dr. Henry F. Grady, then stationed in Teheran, the editorial said: "If a new figure is required, surely, for various reasons, a personal representative of the President would be better than another diplomat." None of these "various reasons" were made available to the reader by this strongly pro-Administration newspaper. But, by noticeable coincidence, Mr. Harriman was assigned a few days later, over Ambassador Grady's head, as Presidential "trouble-shooter" in Iran.

Although resulting in an occasional brilliant success, this sort of personal, extra-departmental diplomacy is essentially irresponsible and tends to circumvent the Constitutional provision for Senate approval of those entrusted with the conduct of our diplomacy. It finally broke down the patience of Secretary Hull, leading him to say that the utilization of private Presidential envoys "tended

⁶ Charles Seymour: *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company; 1926-1928).

in many instances to create havoc with our ambassadors or ministers in the capitals they visited, even though the envoys themselves had no such intention".⁷

⁷ Cordell Hull: *Memoirs* (New York: The Macmillan Company; 1948), Vol. I, p. 200.

The Decline of the Department of State

THE FIRST WORLD WAR, MORE THAN THE POLITICAL machinations of Secretary Bryan, created fissures in the Department of State that were ultimately to develop into yawning cracks. Indeed "the Great Commoner", in retrospect, does not appear as one of the least competent secretaries. His efforts to maintain the traditional American policy of neutrality, to bring the war to a close by negotiation, and at least to preserve peace for the United States, were little short of heroic. President Wilson, in an observation that seems more biting as to subject than object, said of Bryan: "He is absolutely sincere, that is what makes him dangerous."¹

The net effect of World War I, and the personal diplomacy of President Wilson which the Senate repudiated by failing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, was to increase both the psychological and physical strains on the Department of State.

Its career service had been largely liquidated by the spoilsmen, while the demands on the trained personnel that remained were greatly increased, not least by the multiplicity of new and highly unstable governments brought to birth in Europe under the Wilsonian policy

¹ Quoted, Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

of self-determination. All these new sovereignties, in what a contemporary English writer (H. N. Brailsford) called "Balkanized Europe", required additional American diplomatic representation, to say nothing of our delicate and anomalous relations with the repudiated League of Nations. Meantime the dominant isolationism made it more difficult to secure the funds essential to reorganize the department for its enlarged responsibilities. Of 788 employees, foreign service excluded, on December 1, 1919, only 353 had permanent status.²

Obviously the first step was to equip the department to cope more adequately with its post-war tasks. Robert Lansing, Counsellor under Bryan and Wilson's wartime Secretary, saw the need of this. On January 21, 1920, three weeks before his resignation, Lansing wrote to Representative John Jacob Rogers, of Massachusetts, saying:

"The machinery of government now provided for dealing with our foreign relations is in need of complete repair and reorganization. . . . American agents in the foreign field must broaden the scope and intensify the nature of their work in order that the Department of State may have at its disposal knowledge of the actual facts of every development or turn of events." ³

Representative Rogers, like many of his colleagues of both parties, possessed a keen awareness and understanding of the departmental needs. With the change of Administration and the appointment of Charles Evans

² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

³ Committee on Foreign Affairs *Hearings*, 68th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 30-31.

Hughes, who was to President Harding much like Secretary Fish to President Grant, it was possible to get action from the Republican Congress. On May 24, 1924, the Rogers Act came into effect.

It established a Foreign Service in which the merit system would govern from vice-consul up to Ambassadorial level. It integrated the heretofore separate consular and diplomatic services, making the officers of both interchangeable. It provided for the return of foreign service officers from the field, for three-year assignment at departmental headquarters in Washington. In short the Rogers Act re-established, regularized and legally confirmed American diplomacy as a reliable professional career, wholly non-partisan and largely outside the grasp of political patronage. There would have been a better case for the bipartisan foreign policy if the spirit and letter of the bipartisan Rogers Act had been maintained.

For a time this was the case. Under Secretary Hughes, as with Secretary Hay before him, economy itself produced efficiency. The departmental payroll was cut from 714 in 1921 to 590 in 1923,⁴ yet the elimination of deadwood markedly improved morale.

This upward trend became more pronounced when President Coolidge, by executive order of June 7, 1924, authorized establishment of a Foreign Service Personnel Board, to recommend promotion on a basis of attested efficiency. There was justification for later charges that those with consular service suffered discrimination at the hands of this board. But those complaints, brought out by healthy Democratic criticism, were met by recom-

⁴ Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

mendations made binding in the Moses-Linthicum Act of 1931.

It was also asserted, with perhaps a little justification, that a tendency towards snobbishness and caste began to develop in the Foreign Service as its status became more secure and its prerogatives recognized. Ceremonial undoubtedly was more emphasized, especially after the Division of Protocol was established by Secretary Kellogg, in 1928.

The present writer, however, worked in close and often intimate journalistic contact with many foreign service officers, in Europe from 1928 to 1931, in Washington from 1931 to 1940. Seldom, if ever, was the "high-hat" attitude offensive, even when occasionally perceptible. Snobbishness does not thrive in the American climate. And rarely has it been knocked down more effectively than by Elihu Root. It was suggested to that outstanding Secretary that American diplomats should be uniformed in satin knee breeches, silk coats and frills *à l'Anglais*. Root took care of the proposal by advocating one additional asset: "that a sprig of mistletoe be embroidered on the coattails."⁵

During the Hoover Administration, "more than four-fifths of the posts abroad were filled by men named from the career service".⁶ And State Department morale was fortified in many other ways under the direction of Henry L. Stimson. It "must be strengthened and supported as the great arm of our government dedicated to

⁵ Philip C. Jessup: *Elihu Root* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company; 1938) Vol. II, p. 107.

⁶ Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

the organization of peace", said Mr. Hoover on Armistice Day of 1929. For the following fiscal year, 1930-31, Secretary Stimson requested a departmental appropriation of \$17,097,426 and Congress trimmed it by only \$77,000, thus demonstrating that executive and legislature can work co-operatively when there is mutual trust. In retrospect, the decade from 1922 to 1932 stands out as a luminous period in State Department history. But it was one of Indian Summer.

On November 23, 1932, Assistant Secretary Wilbur J. Carr, then a veteran of over forty years of State Department service, was able to tell Congress that: "Our organization now, we think, at least is the best we have ever had; I mean as to business organization and as to quality of personnel."⁷ Yet only two years later Mr. Carr felt it necessary to tell another Congressional Committee (House Foreign Affairs) that: "The distress in the Foreign Service today is greater than at any time within the memory of those of us in the Department of State."

Something had happened, between the morale peak of 1932 and the valley of 1934.

2.

ON MARCH 4, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt began his twelve-year tenure of the Presidency, gave 54 words to foreign policy in his Inaugural Address and promptly

⁷ *Hearings*, Dept. of State Appropriation Bill, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 52.

scuttled the London Economic Conference. Secretary of State Hull accepted this affront to his planning, as he did many other rebuffs during a period of office almost as long as that of the President, in fact the longest ever held by any Secretary of State. Mr. Hull's success, unfortunately, is not measurable by the length of time that he nominally directed the department in charge of American foreign policy.

There is no question that Secretary Hull personally desired to maintain the standards and traditions of the foreign service. He urged President Roosevelt to make at least half of his diplomatic appointments from the professionals available and actually nine out of seventeen Ambassadors, seventeen out of thirty-five Ministers serving in 1935, were career men.⁸ Moreover, by no means all of the political appointees were unsuccessful. One of them, Mrs. Ruth Bryan Owen, as Minister to Denmark, simultaneously honored the "Great Commoner" through his daughter and catered to Mr. Roosevelt's pleasure in breaking precedents by creating the first woman envoy plenipotentiary in American history.

The new divisions initially established were also competently directed, that of Trade Agreements by Dr. Henry F. Grady; that of Research and Publication by Dr. Cyril Wynne; that of International Communications by Thomas Burke; that of Cultural Relations by Professor Ben M. Cherrington of the University of Denver; that of Controls, growing out of the office of Arms and Munitions Control established under the neutrality

⁸ Benjamin H. Williams: *American Diplomacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company; 1936), p. 459.

legislation, by its former chief, Joseph C. Green. Through this and other expansion the departmental expense was pushed up, though not excessively. In 1940, as the war got under way in Europe, the State Department still had only 971 employes in Washington.

Nevertheless there were intimations, long before the Nazi invasion of Poland, that the Department of State was losing its grip as a responsible agency in the direction of foreign policy. In various ways President Roosevelt showed a contemptuous attitude towards the professional foreign service, tending more and more to rely on his personal agents, or his own diplomatic appointees. This tendency, perhaps natural in the emergency, was greatly strengthened after the outbreak of the war and led to serious deterioration of State Department morale. The fact is apparent between the lines of Secretary Hull's *Memoirs*, in addition to much other evidence. The mission of Undersecretary Sumner Welles to Europe early in 1940, undertaken on the President's initiative but without the approval of Mr. Hull, "brought the latent antagonism between Secretary Hull and Undersecretary Welles into such an active state that they could no longer work together satisfactorily in the Department."⁹

⁹ Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

3.

THE ENTRY of the United States into the war seriously affected the Department of State, by reason of both internal and external pressures.

On the internal side the war brought into the department, burgeoning daily with new bureaus, offices and attempted functions, many hundreds of enthusiastic but largely unqualified employes. Especially prominent among these were college and university teachers of "political science", unfortunately to a large extent themselves deficient in the scientific attitude. Few of this type had any administrative experience whatever, but practically all were filled with a fine fervor for "international co-operation" and convinced that "isolationism" was of the devil.

As late as the end of 1946 one of this group felt it appropriate to describe "the true isolationist" as a "usually naive" person who believed that: "the United States would through its own might and wisdom be able to direct its high destiny independently of the fate of the outside world." This professor, with teaching experience on the faculties of Harvard, Princeton and Pennsylvania, then Chief of the (new) Division of Training Services, Department of State, concluded sagely that: "The impact of events has so shattered this type of outlook that it no longer finds expression in any significant political grouping."¹

¹ Dr. William P. Maddox: "The Foreign Service in Transition," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1947.

Since the career service owed its entire being to rational faith in the ability of the United States "to direct its high destiny independently", the swing to lyrical internationalism, soon to be punctured by Stalin, increased the confusion and demoralization of the trained State Department personnel. With the end of the war the career men, frustrated and sick at heart, began to resign at an alarming rate. No matter: more professors took their places. And very few of these gave up their \$10,000 wartime jobs to return to lecturing at a competitive rate of half that sum, or less.

4.

THE MOST ambitious example of amateur statecraft during the war period was the wholly laudable, but in the upshot pathetic, attempt to plan a neatly packaged postwar world. A detailed official account of this effort is available in the 700-page volume entitled *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-45*, released by the Department of State in February, 1950.² Its introduction says that the volume "originated in the desire expressed on April 19, 1946, by President Harry S. Truman that a record be written of the structure and conduct of the extraordinary preparation of our postwar foreign policy as made in the Department of State during World War II."

² Publication 3580; General Foreign Policy Series 15.

"Extraordinary" is the *mot juste*, for nowhere in this encyclopedic volume can one find any indication of any State Department preparation for what actually happened—the triumph of the will of the Soviet over huge areas in both Europe and Asia.

The report does quote the skeptical attitude of the Moscow government towards the Atlantic Charter as voiced by the Russian Ambassador to Great Britain on September 24, 1941: ". . . the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs and historic peculiarities of particular countries". But the State Department editor, Mr. Harley A. Notter, somehow interpreted this equivocal statement as "Soviet . . . agreement with the principles of the Charter."³

On March 21, 1942, to pick a date almost at random, "four subcommittees . . . reported their progress." Mr. Sumner Welles presided and reported that:

". . . the Subcommittee on Political Problems envisaged three stages of action after the conclusion of hostilities by surrender of the enemy: a short stage lasting not more than a year after the armistice, during which an armistice would be signed and action taken on immediate problems connected with the end of the war, then a longer transitional stage of indefinite length leading to the third stage, namely the beginning of definitive permanent peace."⁴

Following this prescient forecast "a chart of problems thought to fall within these three stages" was read. Dr. Isaiah Bowman, then President of Johns Hopkins Uni-

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

versity, reported for the territorial subcommittee and said spaciously that:

"... It would consider the forces operative upon governments of states, conditions and activities prevailing within states, resources and relative geographic position of states, and problems of boundaries, resettlement, and nationalities."⁵

At this same meeting there was "a recognition of the need . . . promptly to bring the Soviet Union and China into the exploratory discussions of postwar problems".⁶

Judging by the number of eventually reputed or suspected Communists who took part, at one time or another, in these secret State Department talks, the Soviet Union was in effect already in.

5.

WHILE the thousands of man-hours spent in this round-table procedure did finally produce the Charter of the United Nations, in its present highly unsatisfactory form, it also drew heavily on the time of well-trained, hard-headed career officials who were brought in to report to the dilettantes on "specific fields of work". Soon the career men were swamped by the influx from under the academic elms. "By the end of 1943 almost one hundred specialists were preparing special studies and advising on political problems which seemed likely to need considera-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

tion for the establishment of a just and permanent peace.”⁷ Many more than that number of stenographers and clerks typed the drafts, typed the revisions, indexed the material, labelled it “top secret” and filed it away.

When President Roosevelt went to Yalta, early in 1945, State Department employes hopefully loaded huge cases of these precious recommendations aboard the cruiser *Quincy*, for executive consideration during the long sea voyage. As forthright Jimmy Byrnes tells the story, nobody in the Presidential entourage paid the slightest attention to the mountainous compilations.⁸ At Yalta itself, Stalin was even more disrespectful to “the extraordinary preparation of our postwar foreign policy as made in the Department of State”.

Nevertheless there was some method in all this madness. The aim of Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, an economist who came to head the “Division of Special Research”, seems to have been to develop State Department control over foreign economic, as well as political, policy. “Complete handling of the problems by a single organization was clearly necessary.”⁹

Accordingly, on September 12, 1941, Dr. Pasvolsky “proposed that the President be requested to authorize the creation of an advisory committee for preparatory work on all phases of postwar foreign policy. . . . its membership would include Vice President Henry A. Wallace and a number of prominent persons outside the Department [of State] as well as a number of officials of the Department.”¹

⁷ Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

⁸ *Speaking Frankly*, p. 23.

⁹ *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, p. 58.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

This Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy was approved by the President shortly after Pearl Harbor and began to co-ordinate other government agencies, including selected members of Congress, soon after. The meetings grew more and more complicated—and fatuous. For instance, Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, joined the Committee on January 2, 1943, “taking part especially in the consideration of political problems”.²

Here was a decidedly extra-curricular activity for the pleasant poet who had become Librarian of Congress. Before long, however, the political interest of Mr. MacLeish made him Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Public and Cultural Relations, in which connection he arranged a series of public broadcasts. One was entitled: “It’s Your State Department”, which would have been fair enough if it had been beamed exclusively to the White House.

6.

THE PASVOLSKY PROJECT failed partly because of poor organization, but even more because the Department of State was neither equipped nor designed to handle the vast program of foreign economic activities that mushroomed out after Pearl Harbor. Trying to keep pace with all this development, let alone direct it, soon placed

² *Ibid.*, p. 76.

an impossible external pressure on the department. The hopelessness of its floundering has been concisely defined by James Grafton Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State in the Stimson regime, in the foreword to Mr. Wallace Parks' interesting study of *U.S. Administration of Its International Economic Affairs*. Says Mr. Rogers:

"It was clear that State could not operate all this flotilla of foreign maneuvers. It pretty soon became clear to some of us that it could not operate any of them very efficiently because its basic approach, namely its function of developing considered and consistent lines of policy, was incompatible with executive efficiency, drive and specialization."

The Hoover Commission, on which Mr. Rogers served as a consultant, carefully considered all the complexities of the subject and concluded that:

"The State Department as a general rule should not be given responsibility for the operation of specific programs, whether overseas or at home.

"The State Department should continue to discharge its traditional responsibilities of representation, reporting and negotiation." ³

Unfortunately, by the time this report was published (February, 1949) the Department was all snarled up, by the blanketing in of other agencies, by the resignation of many of its best men, by its staggering misjudgment of the Russian attitude, by the belated revelations of subversion and incompetence in its own staff, by the effort devoted to singing its own praises and most of all by general hypertrophy of function. Whatever Secretary Ache-

³ *Report on Foreign Affairs*, Recommendations Nos. 7 and 8.

son's virtues, it soon became clear that he was not the man to get the swollen organization deflated and on its feet again.

As pointed out in the Hoover Commission's *Report on Foreign Affairs*, "the Congress should appreciate that leadership in the conduct of foreign affairs can only come from the executive side of the government". Equally, however, "the executive branch must appreciate the role of the Congress and the propriety of its participation in foreign affairs where legislative decisions are required."⁴

Such is the present internal confusion and hopeless complexity of the Department of State that fundamental legislation, clearly defining function and locating the authority now scattered between this department and the new executive agencies in foreign economic undertakings, is plainly and urgently needed. The Department can no longer be expected to reorganize itself out of the existing morass. Most of its immediate post-war attempts to do so were not even worthy of serious attention. The sensible establishment of an Executive Secretariat and a Policy Planning Staff do not and cannot of themselves meet the problem of co-ordinating all the multifarious overseas commitments into a single intelligible policy.

Definition of State Department function must precede effective reorganization. And legislative definition of the area of appropriate State Department activity is essential because of the enormous complexity and cost of the operations this agency has been endeavoring to direct. Since Congressional action was required to establish the Depart-

⁴ *Report*, p. 8.

ment of State, in 1789, it follows that Congressional action may at any time modify or clarify the statutory authority of this executive agency. It is not only necessary, but also constitutionally proper, for Congress to undertake this task.

The Role of Congress

DURING ITS PERIOD OF DECADENCE, IN WORLD WAR II the Department of State, in official pronouncements, began habitually to refer to the federal Republic which it serves as a "democracy".

The adoption of this practice was not without guile. "Democracy", like "liberty", is one of those beautiful, inspiring, yet misty words that command popular support without requiring any particular official commitment. Words that convey different meanings to different people can be most useful to politicians. As Lincoln dryly said, at the most bitter period of the Civil War: "We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing." The Communists have certainly been helpful in showing us that lip service to "democracy" is wholly compatible with the grossest form of governmental tyranny.

Actually, the United States is far from being a democracy, in the accurate meaning of a political system in which the will of the majority can always force the minority to conform. The Bill of Rights gives the individual citizen certain privileges of which he cannot be deprived even by unanimous vote of Congress. The Constitution also gives the President a wholly undemocratic power of veto. On the border line of Constitutionality

it was demonstrated, in Korea, that a President can in practice commit the country to large-scale war, and send conscripts overseas to fight it, without asking the consent of the elected representatives of the people. Mr. Truman's dictatorial decision in this case was not for that reason necessarily unwise, nor unjustified. But it was certainly undemocratic.

Since the foreign policy of any government requires definitive agreements with other governments it cannot, from its very nature, be democratic in the sense of responding instantaneously to the always variable will of the electorate. That does not mean that foreign policy must tend to develop executive tyranny. It does mean that foreign policy can always be—and history confirms the fact—a potent weapon in the arsenal of tyrants.

Against that ever possible development the people must be continuously on guard, and never more so than when a Foreign Minister assures them that his particular policies are "democratic". Clever, those policies may be, or stupid; extravagant or economical, courageous or cowardly, ethical or opportunistic. But democratic they can never be, either in general or under our Constitution in particular.

2.

HERE IS POSED one of the most difficult problems of political science: the reconciliation of the necessarily arbitrary conduct of foreign policy with the equally essential maintenance of popular government.

That problem was provisionally solved for the United States by certain special applications of that same system of checks and balances which has enabled us to handle our domestic problems, on the whole, surpassingly well. The solution, however, is not guaranteed to work automatically. It demands perhaps as much scientific "know-how" in the political field as the successful operation of jet planes requires in the realm of mechanics.

The method by which the foreign policy of this Republic can be strong without becoming tyrannical is embodied in the Constitution of the United States. And, fortunately, the theory behind this procedure is clearly set forth in a section of the famous *Federalist* papers (Nos. 69 to 77 inclusive) which are available in practically every public library in this country and should be, one would think, required reading at least for college students.

All of this section of *The Federalist* was written by Alexander Hamilton, who was the leading advocate of executive control of foreign policy during the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention. There were many who thought at the time that the Constitution gave far too much power over foreign policy to the President,

and for that very reason Hamilton was chosen to defend his formula in the appeal for ratification by the states, which is what the *Federalist* papers were. In spite of the brilliant and compelling logic of Hamilton's presentation, his success was narrow. The legislature of New York, his own state, approved the Constitution only by the close margin of 30 votes to 27.

Alexander Hamilton, whose political argument was always forthright and honest, of course never claimed that American foreign policy would or could be "democratic". Explaining why the House of Representatives is not allowed to share in the treaty-making power, he says:

" . . . The fluctuating and, taking its future increase into the account, the multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, *secrecy*, and despatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous." ¹

Hamilton indeed frequently and vigorously attacks the whole theory of unbridled political democracy, as contrasted with the qualified principles actually adopted for this Republic. The following passage is only one of many examples that could be cited:

" . . . The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but

¹ *The Federalist*, No. 75.

it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests. It is a just observation, that the people commonly *intend* the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always *reason right* about the *means* of promoting it.”²

Nevertheless, even Alexander Hamilton, the foe of democracy and apostle of centralization, fully agreed that Congress, as the representative organ, should always check and balance the control of foreign policy by the President and his appointed Secretary of State—as that official later came to be known. In No. 69 of the *Federalist* papers, which preceded the quotations cited above, he gives a detailed comparison of the control over foreign policy under the British and the (then) proposed American Constitution. “The king of Great Britain”, he points out, “is the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description.”

Then, later in the same article, Hamilton concludes that “. . . there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature.”

² *Ibid.*, No. 71.

3.

OBVIOUSLY, therefore, the framers of the Constitution intended to give to Congress, and especially to the Senate, a large measure of control in the field of foreign policy. That is clear from the debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. It is clear from the explicit stipulations of the Constitution as it emerged from those debates and stands today. It is clear from the argument in the *Federalist* papers. Indeed the case for carefully supervising executive power in foreign policy has seldom been put more forcibly than by Hamilton in No. 75 of these, which aptly says:

“The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States.”

During World War II an “exalted opinion of human virtue” did unwisely place at “the sole disposal” of one President a power over foreign policy that neither the framers of the Constitution, nor he himself, expected to be unchecked. Although the British had in the meantime taken this power from their king, Americans illogically gave to this President authority that had been deemed insufferable by their forebears when concentrated in George III. For this the bipartisan foreign policy, en-

couraging acquiescence in every executive action, clearly bears much blame.

The Constitution was in several vital respects a matter of rather hazy compromise. Issues that could not be resolved were left, by mutual consent of Federalists and anti-Federalists, to the arbitrament of the future. One such unresolved issue was the right of a state to secede from the Union. It took a civil war to settle that disagreement over the binding force of federation. Also left indeterminate was the issue of whether the President or Congress, in any showdown, has final authority in the direction of foreign policy. The very nature of a balanced system implies some uncertainty on questions of that sort.

The issue of secession, focussed by the practice of slavery in the South, was between the central government and the rebellious states. The issue of the ultimate responsibility for foreign policy is of a different character, within the central government.

On the one hand, our organic law gives the Congress alone power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations", to "define and punish offences against the law of nations", to "declare war", to "raise and support armies", to "provide and maintain a navy", to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces".

On the other hand, the Constitution says explicitly: "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."

In between there is the power given to the President to appoint ambassadors, subject to Senatorial "advice and consent", and the power to make treaties, provided in

the latter case that "two-thirds of the Senators present concur".

Underlying this division of power is the fact that Congress can impeach the President, although he cannot ever dissolve Congress. Together with its control over executive expenditure this shows that the intent of the Constitution is to maintain a continuous critical supervision of foreign policy in the hands of Congress.

We must recall, however, that the Constitutional Convention was confronting one serious political problem that no longer exists. It sought to restrict the power of the Executive, a control that is perennially necessary for freedom. But the Convention had also to deprive the separate states of powers exercised by them to the verge of anarchy, prior to the writing of the Constitution. This purpose is demonstrated by the now superfluous Constitutional limitations on the right of the states to impose duties, make treaties or "engage in war".

The originally sovereign states were willing to cede these powers to a representative Congress, especially to a Senate that emphasized the equality of the states by giving equal representation to all of them, whether large or small. But in 1787 the states would never have agreed to give to the President and his appointees authority in the field of foreign relations that they were reluctant to surrender even to a representative Congress. Today the most Constitutionally-minded citizen must admit both that some of the reasons for circumscribing Presidential power over foreign policy no longer exist and that, in dealing with a foe as unscrupulous as Soviet Russia, new reasons

for giving a well-qualified executive more freedom of action in this field have developed.

4.

EVERY EXECUTIVE is naturally assertive. So it is not surprising that the President has always taken the lead in extending centralized power, and consequently in diminishing the sovereignty of the states. And in this centripetal evolution the President—regardless of his political affiliation—has always tended to arrogate to himself a direction of foreign policy that goes beyond the letter of the Constitution.

Theoretically, the issue is one that should be settled by the courts, as an arm of our Government independent of both the Legislature and the Executive, and indeed authorized to judge between them. That effort has been made, but unsuccessfully because of the overlap in the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the power of Congress to declare war. It is impossible to rule judicially that the President may declare war. It is equally impossible to rule judicially that the President as Commander-in-Chief must not take steps that actually make war inevitable.

So, from the beginning, there has been an ill-defined area—a judicial no man's land—where the President may lawfully exercise powers leading directly to that state of war which Congress alone is empowered to declare. That anomalous situation underlies all of the acrimonious con-

troversy aroused by the Korean War. And it is timely to recall that the issue arises periodically in our national history. Indeed continuity of the problem is well illustrated by the first occasion on which it created bitter partisan feeling.

In 1793, Great Britain went to war to restrain the aggressive intent of revolutionary France, then controlled by an atheistic and imperialistic regime described by contemporaries in much the same phraseology that is applied to Soviet Russia today. President Washington promptly issued a proclamation of neutrality as between France and Britain. Since we then had an alliance with France, his Constitutional right to do so was immediately assailed.

Alexander Hamilton, writing under the pseudonym of "Pacificus", ably defended Washington. In a series of widely circulated articles Hamilton asserted that it is an executive function to determine the obligation of treaties. He went on to argue that regardless of the wording of the Constitution the conduct of foreign affairs must by its very nature be concentrated in the President's hands.

Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, was appalled by what he called "these heresies". Jefferson wrote to James Madison: "For God's sake, take up your pen . . . and cut him [Hamilton] to pieces in the face of the public."

Madison proceeded to do so. Under the pen-name of "Helvidius" he vehemently assailed "the extraordinary doctrine that the powers of making war and treaties are in their nature executive." That, said Madison stingingly, is British political theory, is absolutely un-American, and

is upheld only "by foreigners and degenerate citizens among us".

Thus there was precedent for the fervor, as well as the character, of the debate that broke out during the Eighty-second Congress, brought closer to climax by the Senate inquiry into the dismissal of General MacArthur. The infant Republic survived the acrimony then; it is not injured by similar acerbities today. For it is a sign of strength, not weakness, that the discussion of this fundamental issue flares out perennially. The Constitution left it to posterity to decide, from time to time, just where the Presidential prerogative in foreign policy ends. The problem neither should nor can be settled once and for all, by any arbitrary formula.

Whenever the President loses effective control of Congress, and especially if that happens in a time of crisis, the issues between Pacificus and Helvidius—between Hamilton and Madison—will be redebated, and resolved according to the needs of the day. That this should be happening again is proof that our faith in representative government was not shaken by the unfortunate bipartisan interlude.

5.

THE TERMINATION of a soporific "bipartisanism", the realization that politics cannot stop at the water's edge unless policies also stop there, was the essential prereq-

quisite for the establishment of an intelligent and effective foreign policy. There is no field of human endeavor, from the vocal exercises of young ladies to the reasoning of Supreme Court Justices, which should be immune from honest and expert criticism. Those who resent such criticism simply prove themselves unaware of a fundamental condition of progress. There can be no improvement, but only deterioration, in foreign policy or any other undertaking, if criticism is regarded as objectionable *per se*.

But while the belated restoration of the critical faculty is undeniably healthy, it does not automatically indicate the lines that future foreign policy should follow. It is essential, but not sufficient, to bring foreign policy back into politics. There must also be re-establishment of those underlying principles that alone give politics something more than superficial significance.

The federal nature of the American union itself dictates the fundamental character of American politics. The Constitution divides power between the central government and those of the states, and then in turn separates power in each government, both general and local, into executive, legislative and judicial departments. Under this elaborate system of checks and balances there is, and must be, a continuous struggle between those who seek to centralize governmental power and those who try to keep it diffused.

This clash between "the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies", between Federalists and anti-Federalists, was long since noted by Viscount Bryce as the origin of the di-

vision between American political parties.³ It will continue to divide them, regardless of changes in party name or position, as long as the United States remains a federal republic. When there is no party opposing centralization of power, that in itself will be a sign that the Republic has ceased to exist, in fact if not in name.

Obviously an active and aggressive foreign policy implies centralization of power. It implies not merely concentration of power in the central government, which alone deals with foreign policy. It also implies concentration of power in the executive arm of the central government, which naturally prefers to conduct its relations with other governments unhampered by judicial questioning, parliamentary obstruction, or public criticism.

The advocate of an aggressive foreign policy is therefore likely to be an advocate of centralization. For he cannot consistently urge that the Administration be untrammelled in its conduct of foreign relations yet subject to strict Constitutional checks and balances in its control over domestic activities. Conversely, the advocate of a limited foreign policy cannot consistently urge that the Executive should be given power to override local government in social issues, such as FEPC or Federal control of education. One may support either the expansion or the limitation of Presidential power. To advocate both simultaneously is perilously close to double talk.

From the very nature of this Republic it follows that there will always be—as long as the Republic endures—two schools of thought in foreign policy. Isolationist and

³ James Bryce: *The American Commonwealth* (New York: The Macmillan Company; 1897), Vol. II, pp. 5-6.

Interventionist would be very good names for them, except that both words have acquired derogatory overtones. But whatever the descriptive titles, the underlying cleavage will remain, and grow sharp whenever the issues involved become vital to the hearts and minds and pockets of our citizens.

None who really believes in this Republic would hope or want to see this political cleavage eliminated, for the pulsation of the two forces is as necessary to national vigor as the inhalation and exhalation in breathing. And that simile itself suggests that a rhythm can be established—that there is an area of concord in which all men of good will, be they isolationist or interventionist, may agree; the more readily in a time of obvious national peril.

6.

DURING the decade of the nineteen-forties, however, the Congress of the United States virtually abdicated its function in the field of foreign policy. From the signing of the Atlantic Charter, on August 12, 1941, to the commitment of American military forces to war in Korea, on June 27, 1950, the Administration on many occasions neither consulted nor informed the Congress in regard to actions that were, in many cases, of the most vital consequence to the national welfare. This was not political rhythm, but slavish legislative acquiescence in a budding executive tyranny.

It is no mere coincidence that this same decade, in which the rule was arbitrary executive direction of foreign policy, proved the most disastrous in the entire diplomatic history of the Republic. At the close of the forties the United States by official admission possessed far less security than at their opening, in spite of the enormous sacrifices made in winning smashing victories over Japan, Germany, Italy and the smaller Axis powers. Responsibility for this deterioration could not be evaded by those administrative officers who for ten years had exercised practically unquestioned control over foreign policy.

The first step in the rebuilding of an intelligent foreign policy, out of the ruins everywhere apparent, was restoration of the abandoned critical function. During the forties by far the greater part of the American press had confined itself to fulsome praise of every administrative action in this field, no matter how shortsighted and senseless. A typical illustration was the comment of *Time* Magazine on the first reports of the Yalta Conference: "all doubts about the Big Three's ability to cooperate in peace as well as in war seem now to have been swept away".⁴

In spite of the war psychology, a few journalists and editors conscientiously endeavored to inform the American public of the coming disillusionment, which State Department propaganda could delay but could not possibly avert. As an illustration, the present writer, on February 21, 1945, said of Yalta in *Human Events*, a paper

⁴ Quoted in Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

under his own control, with a circulation of 4000 as against a million or more for *Time*:

"The Russian system of federated and satellite Soviet States is unlikely to stop its westward expansion with Poland, or its eastward development at the borders of Inner Mongolia. With the capture of Budapest the outward push from Asia gathers a momentum unparalleled since the Turks stormed up the Danube in the Sixteenth Century. But the Mohammedan conquests had no such physical power behind them, and no such fertile soil ahead, as has Russia today."

The steady extension and consolidation of Russian strength in central and southeastern Europe, and even more the subsequent conquest of China by Communism, sharply awakened more and more Americans to what was actually happening. But State Department lullabies and a barrage of pro-Communist propaganda from Leftist writers served dangerously to delay the inevitable revulsion. Communist influence in the Department of State apparently reached its peak early in 1946, when the Kremlin was seeking to consolidate the enormous gains so sweepingly yielded to it by President Roosevelt's personal diplomacy.

It would be a mistake to think that the attempted Communist manipulation was confined to the Far Eastern division of the department, although undoubtedly very influential there. An almost equally powerful effort was made to undermine General Franco's strongly anti-Communist regime in Spain, which first Secretary Marshall and then Secretary Acheson publicly denounced as "Fascist".

On March 4, 1946, when James F. Byrnes was Secretary of State, that department issued to the press a carefully selected compilation of "representative documents" obtained from the archives of the defeated Axis powers. The evident purpose in publicizing these documents was to persuade the American people that Spain had intended "to enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy". There was then, in the possession of the Department of State, as much or more documentation indicating that Franco sought primarily to preserve the same neutrality that President Roosevelt had at first indorsed for the United States. But that part of the documentation was held back.

By July, 1951, the picture had changed so completely that Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was dispatched to Madrid to urge the same "Fascist Franco" to form a military alliance with the United States.

The issue as to these negotiations, unconcluded at Admiral Sherman's untimely death in Europe, is not whether the State Department's first policy of withdrawing recognition from Franco, and its subsequent policy of making an ally of him, was wise or unwise. What seems beyond dispute is the necessity of more outspoken examination and continuous analysis of a foreign policy that can so quickly and completely reverse itself.

The bipartisan foreign policy served only to prevent such helpful consideration at a time when it could have saved lives and honor, money and prestige. And it seems something of a miracle that, due to the heroic efforts of a minority, public opinion did eventually rise in its wrath

against the tendentious stream of official and unofficial indorsement of the Communist Party line. As late as the end of 1949, Anna Louise Strong could conclude her book entitled *The Chinese Conquer China* by asking rhetorically:

“Is it possible, then, for the chiefs of American monopoly capital, leading the reactionary forces of the world, to destroy this new China? It is not.”

It is quite possible, however, that without the revelations of Communist influence in the Department of State, first disclosed in the conviction of Alger Hiss for perjury, the Republic would have been undermined as completely as was China itself. To the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives goes much of the credit for revealing the Communist infiltration in time. The Republic was certainly not saved either by the Department of State, or by the press.

On August 16, 1948, when Representative (now Senator) Richard M. Nixon first concluded that Hiss was lying, a long step towards the reassertion of Congressional control in foreign policy was taken. Since then, and especially since the elections of November 7, 1950, there has been a steady tendency for Congress fully to re-establish its Constitutional prerogative in this field. Senator Robert A. Taft has been especially forceful in emphasizing that the issue here is nothing less than the survival of this Republic.

The Area of Agreement

IN THE SCIENCE OF PHYSICAL MEASUREMENT, MEN LONG since established reliable standards, to facilitate that agreement which is almost impossible on any subject without a common base of reference.

Because of these standards, only a very naive child can now be confused by the ancient catch which asks whether a pound of feathers or a pound of lead is heavier. We learn very early that a pound is a pound and a yard is a yard, no matter what substance is being weighed or measured. Most of us also soon come to realize that our national government maintains a Bureau of Standards, in Washington, to insure that there will be no trifling with measurements that must be standardized as a reliable basis for commercial transactions of every kind.

The maintenance of standards is a proper and indeed an essential function of government. To permit any form of counterfeiting here would quickly create the very chaos in human relations that government is set up to prevent. The verb "counterfeit" simply means "to make against", and nobody is permitted to make dollar bills, or other units of measurement, counter to the standards that the state maintains. The police take care of that.

Unfortunately, it is not so easy to police high government officials when they themselves decide to falsify a

public transaction, or to practice a subtle counterfeiting by the state against the people. Inflation, which is simply governmental depreciation of its own currency, was foreshadowed when the dollar was made inconvertible—when the United States, in effect, abandoned the gold standard. But “men are so simple”, as Machiavelli said, as not to realize that for government to abandon standards, whether physical or moral, is to invite eventual chaos in the area where the deserted standard has heretofore maintained stability and confidence.

There are standards in political as well as in physical science. And, when these political standards have been tested and accepted over a long period, to desert them, even under the plea of national emergency, causes as much confusion as would be the case if the yard were shortened or the pound lessened, as a part of the defense effort. We must take warning from the confusion caused by dollar depreciation, resulting from debasement of a once reliable governmental standard.

The abandonment of its traditional standards by the Department of State is pitifully revealed by the complete instability and apparent opportunism of its foreign policy since the close of World War II. We have swung violently from alliance with Chiang Kai-shek to official denunciation of his regime; from official denunciation of General Franco to the preparation of military alliance with him; from the dismantling of German factories to their re-equipment for war production; from wholesale gifts to Stalin's Russia to embargoes on any trade with Stalin's Russia.

These are only random illustrations of a pervading in-

firmity and uncertainty of purpose which leads many to doubt that the United States, under its present political leadership, is fitted to be what the Department of State grandiloquently calls: "a defensive shield for the free world".¹

The Department of State continuously asserts that its procedures are "democratic". That is nonsense. Everybody knows instinctively what this book has patiently explained: that the daily conduct of foreign policy is necessarily an undemocratic executive function. As Chief Justice Marshall said long since: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Recognizing this, the American people have always loyally supported foreign policy decisions which they often neither understood nor approved. This support has been rendered because of confidence in the standards of those entrusted with the direction of foreign policy.

Much of that confidence has now been destroyed. And nobody can be expected to give more than grudging support to policies that lose all consistency from one month to the next. For this executive inadequacy the threat from Soviet Russia, while very real, is an ineffective alibi. It was our foreign policy that built that threat to its present magnitude.

Before the present widespread doubt and apprehension in regard to American foreign policy can be removed, standards of honesty and integrity must be re-established by the Executive, or else enforced upon it by Congress.

¹ Dept. of State Publication No. 4236, General Foreign Policy Series 52, p. 1.

2.

REALIZING its extreme unpopularity, Department of State officials, during the Acheson regime, assiduously endeavored to show themselves responsive to public thinking.

Early in 1951 the department published, and distributed widely at the taxpayers' expense, a pamphlet entitled "Our Foreign Policy".² This says: "In recent years the Government has made a prodigious effort to establish closer relations with the people, to develop a two-way traffic of facts and ideas."

The misuse of the word "Government" in this statement is itself revealing. What is meant is the "Administration", which undoubtedly has made a "prodigious effort", by establishing huge and expensive publicity offices, to sell its program to the people. But this is no "two-way traffic". It is a one-way, four-lane highway of Administration propaganda, designed to make the American public believe that whatever the Department of State decides, no matter how wasteful and contradictory, is in the interest of the general welfare.

Although it claims to believe in "two-way traffic" the Department of State does not furnish for domestic information any criticism whatsoever of its shifting policies. Wholly unimportant speeches by minor bureaucrats are reprinted as documentary material in the weekly Department of State Bulletin. Defensive pamphlets, books and

² Publication No. 3972.

reports pour forth from its Division of Publications. Lecturers, editors and correspondents are frequently called together, entertained and "briefed" on what they should say in support of departmental policies. Congressional hearings on the Department's 1952 budget "disclosed that various and sundry employees of the USIE [Voice of America] made a total of 364 speeches and talks in 29 states" between July, 1949, and February, 1951. The House Appropriations Committee commented tartly: "It is difficult to see how this program's primary purpose . . . is benefited by wholesale speech-making to our own people."³

The Department of State, remember, never disseminates in this country any material that is in any way critical of itself. It replies to these criticisms, at public expense, but does not publicize them. To call this procedure a "two-way traffic of facts and ideas" is something less than forthright. And as this technique grew and exfoliated State Department employes began to assume that they really are "the Government", forgetting that in our Republic elected members of the Congressional opposition are just as much a part of "Government" as are appointed officials of the Administration provisionally in power.

Through Congressional control of appropriations, the Department of State was in 1951 forced to backtrack on some of its least defensible practices, and perhaps to acquire some actual respect for those democratic processes to which so much lip service had previously been given.

³ House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Dept. of State Appropriations Bill, *Committee Print*, pp. 7-8.

The House of Representatives, very properly, took the lead in exerting this "power of the purse".

In hearings before a House Appropriations subcommittee case after case of State Department extravagance was exposed, though none of these was reported by the department's "Office of Public Affairs".

On February 26, 1951, as an illustration, Mr. Ben H. Brown, then "Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations", was asked to explain why "two officers and three clerks" could not handle all the work for which his particular section wanted 27 employes and an appropriation of \$171,747 for fiscal 1952. Mr. Brown endured a rather acid examination, especially when it developed that his Mr. Moreland, described as "liaison official with the House of Representatives", was unknown to the Congressmen. As the verbatim testimony shows, this was too much for Representative John J. Rooney, of Brooklyn, the Democratic chairman of the subcommittee:

"MR. ROONEY. While we are on this subject: Is there any particular reason why we have been denied the privilege of meeting with Mr. Moreland?

"MR. BROWN. No, and I shall see that is corrected.

"MR. ROONEY. Perhaps you will not need to do so.

"Now, you say you wrote 6,300 letters to Members of Congress. That is about 31 a day, is it not?

"MR. BROWN. Over the whole year, yes. That is the average. Of course, they were not all received in that ratio.

"MR. ROONEY. You do not show very much in results with regard to bills before the Congress, and now it turns out that

you are answering only approximately 31 letters a day, and you have a staff of 27 people that cost the taxpayers \$171,747.”⁴

The House Committee was even more scathing about entertainment lavished by the Department of State on visitors brought to this country under one phase of its “cultural relations” program. Very pleasant lunches, some of which the present writer has been privileged to attend, were given under this program to visiting firemen from all of our extensive list of Allies. Unfortunately the cost of these lunches, *vin et service inclus*, comes somewhat high by the luncheon standards of the American taxpayer who democratically foots the bill. In 1951 this lavish entertainment was averaging out at \$8.73 per guest per meal. To continue these free lunches, in 1952, the State Department requested an item of \$24,875.

Said the House Appropriations Committee: “The Department can and must, as far as this committee is concerned, dispense with such luxuries.”⁵

3.

WHILE ITEMS such as the above may seem trifling, they have real importance as examples of the profligate attitude that has replaced the parsimony enforced on the De-

⁴ House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Dept. of State Appropriations Bill, *Hearings*, pp. 37-38.

⁵ *Committee Print*, p. 7.

partment of State in its greater days. Requested appropriations are still relatively modest, even though they soared from \$18,579,756 in fiscal 1932 to \$283,566,476 in fiscal 1952. In 1931 Congress cut only \$73,450 from the departmental estimates for the ensuing fiscal year; in 1951 it cut over \$55,000,000.

There is, however, nothing modest about the cost of the hand-outs now known as "foreign economic policy", which at least some high officials of the Department of State desire to direct under their undivided control.

Under the guise of strengthening its diplomatic hand the Administration has spent billions, and plans to spend billions more, on "foreign economic policy". The Marshall Plan was only the entering wedge in this field. What is known as "Point Four", meaning the fourth objective of President Truman's foreign policy as outlined in his Inaugural Address of January, 1949, is now being systematically pressed. Since the first three of these objectives—strengthening the United Nations, securing world economic recovery and discouraging aggression—were not too well attained, it is not surprising that there should be the greater emphasis on Point Four, defined by Mr. Truman as: "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas".

In the State Department brochure on "Our Foreign Policy", already referred to, there is a section entitled "The Promise of Point Four". It says not a word as to eventual cost, but blandly asserts that "Congress put its approval on the program in April, 1950, and gave the

State Department the job of directing the work of technical co-operation". Actually Congress then did nothing of the kind. What it did was to cut the requested appropriation to the relatively trivial sum of \$34.5 million, to be spent by the State Department in exploratory surveys.

The Administration's long-range intent in regard to Point Four was first revealed in the study compiled by Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army, released by the White House on November 10, 1950. In making public this report on "Foreign Economic Policies" Mr. Truman said that its "guiding concept" is "the unity of foreign policy in its economic, political, military and informational aspects". But to the reader who penetrated behind the cloud of phrases it became clear that the real objective was to blanket the ECA organization into the Department of State, much as OWI was blanketed in after World War II, and then begin permanent foreign-aid spending on a formidable scale. Mr. Gray estimated that direct Federal grants "up to about 500 million dollars a year for several years, apart from emergency requirements arising from military action" would be required to initiate "needed, feasible and effective programs" of technical assistance.⁶

A fortnight after publication of the Gray Report, President Truman requested another study, on "the problems of the underdeveloped areas in relation to mobilization for defense". The agency to which this inquiry was assigned was the International Development Advisory Board, a quasi-independent organization under the chair-

⁶ *Report on Foreign Economic Policies*, p. 69.

manship of Nelson A. Rockefeller. But its letter of assignment from the President said flatly: "You will wish to formulate your recommendations in the light of the Gray Report's comprehensive analysis of our entire foreign economic policy." ⁷

The IDAB report, entitled "Partners in Progress", was transmitted to the President on March 7, 1951, and was warmly approved by him. In a chapter entitled "Centralize for Action" it recommended "the speedy centralization and unification of major foreign economic activities . . . into one overall agency headed by a single administrator reporting directly to the President." This "Overseas Economic Administrator", said the report, "would operate under the overall foreign policy laid down by the Secretary of State on behalf of the President . . ." ⁸

This proposed enlargement of the scope of foreign policy, and the administrative changes envisaged to make it effective, are so enormous as to demand the fullest Congressional inquiry, not only as to cost but also in respect to their functional desirability. In the meantime, the expense of the amorphous and undetermined transitional foreign policy is steadily mounting. On May 24, 1951, President Truman asked Congress for a special appropriation of \$8.5 billion to be spent overseas during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952. Of this sum \$6.25 billion was requested for "military assistance to other free nations"; \$2.25 billion for "economic assistance to other free nations". An "International Security Affairs Committee", under a State Department chairman, has been set

⁷ *Partners in Progress*, p. 90.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

up "to insure co-ordinated policy guidance" for the new foreign aid program, which Secretary Acheson says will require expenditure at the rate of \$8.5 billion per annum until 1955 at least. But Congress has not responded well.

It is the grandiose and unlimited nature of this foreign policy, "economic, political, military and informational", that in the last analysis explains the depreciation of the dollar, in spite of a program of taxation that promises to become more onerous than that ever carried without disaster by any other people. And it is impossible to assert that former President Hoover exaggerated in saying in his broadcast of October 19, 1950: "The United States, with all its resources, cannot long endure the present drain on our economy."

4.

THE FOREIGN POLICY of the United States will eventually be cut down to size, either by voluntary limitation of commitments or else by the economic collapse from overstrain that Stalin, not without reason, anticipates. When the inevitable retrenchment comes, in what framework will a deflated policy crystallize?

There is no question that all Americans unite on the necessity of defending not only the continental United States, but all of Latin-America and Canada as well. The most extreme "isolationist" would approve this as a minimum program. And to call this program "isolationist" is

a misnomer, since it involves active co-operation with 21 other republics and a self-governing British Dominion, plus existing British, Dutch and French colonies in the two continents of North and South America.

Unanimity on Pan-American defense springs not merely from its unquestionable importance for national security, but even more from traditional acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine, as valid a cornerstone of American foreign policy today as when it was first laid down, in 1823.

The Monroe Doctrine, however, was proclaimed in concert with Great Britain. It owed its initial efficacy to British sea power. It implied that if at any time Great Britain could not protect Canada, the United States would do so. Indeed the Anglo-American partnership set up by the Monroe Doctrine throughout carries the implication that the United States will assume mutual responsibilities if, as and when Great Britain lays them down.

Because this working agreement with Great Britain was implied, rather than specific, in the Monroe Doctrine, the interpretation of what the relationship involves politically has not always been uniform. There has been a willingness, demonstrated in every period of peril, to come to Britain's aid. This co-operative attitude, however, has never concealed some sharp disagreement in Anglo-American relations. On more than one occasion, notably in the Venezuelan dispute of 1895, the Monroe Doctrine has actually been invoked *against* Great Britain. In general, the Doctrine has meant that the United States supports Great Britain, but not all British policies and

commitments. Among the British, the reverse of this attitude is equally prevalent.

As long as Great Britain remained a powerful Empire, mistrust of its imperial policy was an impediment to any formal Anglo-American political connection. But as Great Britain has declined in strength, and become dependent on American support, this impediment has as steadily diminished. Britain waging a war of naked aggression against two small Boer Republics in 1900 was an object for self-righteous American condemnation. Britain struggling vainly in 1950 to stamp out Communist guerrillas in Malaya was deemed worthy of American aid, not less so because we get most of our natural rubber from Malaya.

5.

UNDOUBTEDLY the growth of American industrial production, and the consequent growth in the needs of industry for imported raw materials, has helped to bring a significant change in the national attitude towards "imperialism". Our interest in an uninterrupted flow of certain "colonial" products has become much more pronounced in recent years, and with it has developed a disposition to regard as an enemy any agency that threatens that supply, and as an ally any agency that protects it.

Consequently the American attitude towards Empire

is changing; becoming much closer to that of the Nineteenth Century European Empires which used to be regarded here with deep suspicion. There is, still, an overlap in attitudes, a lingering of the old viewpoint that continues along with the growth of the new. We are illogically disposed to acclaim self-determination in principle while opposing it wherever our own vital interests are concerned, something that naturally adds to public confusion. But there can be little doubt as to which force is winning.

At the close of the last war the principle of self-determination was still active in American foreign policy. The Department of State approved independence for the Philippines, Korea, India, Burma and Indonesia. There was no reason to stop with these new nations. Indo-China and Malaya could logically have been added to the list of "liberated" peoples.

But a new attitude arose with realization that this "liberation" of "subject peoples" was actually playing into the hands of Communism. Lenin had written, after the first world war, that "We shall conquer Europe in a by-pass through Asia", and a quarter of a century later American diplomacy awoke to the significance of this remark. The awakening was not delayed by the tendency of the new Asiatic nations to side with Russia against the United States in the debates of the United Nations. As a result, there is no more talk of freeing Indo-China from French, and Malaya from British, control. And if the clock could be turned back it may be doubted that the State Department would now work for an independent Indonesia. In the ugly dispute over nationaliza-

tion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the American diplomacy on the whole supported that of the British Government.

So the American attitude towards imperialism has shifted, from clear-cut opposition to qualified support. And naturally Russian diplomacy has been quick to capitalize on the change. Here it seems fantastic that Russia should call the United States imperialistic, while Moscow poses in our old role of friend of the oppressed. But it doesn't seem so fantastic throughout the long belt of countries from Egypt to Korea.

6.

IN CHAPTER II it was said that: "The traditional methods used to achieve national security are aggrandizement and alliances." The United States is using both those methods today. It will clarify our thinking if we admit as much.

In the Pacific area, thanks primarily to the astute and careful diplomacy of John Foster Dulles, there has been arranged not merely a wholly friendly American settlement with Japan, but also a network of secondary agreements that could bring eventual stabilization, with an American military protectorate over Japan, Formosa and the Philippines. Mr. Dulles, Republican consultant to the Secretary of State, did all that could be done to ameliorate the disastrous consequences of Yalta, which Secretary Acheson so ill-advisedly sought to defend. It is

noteworthy that the keystone of Dulles' work was the "peace of reconciliation" with Japan.

This was a happy reincarnation of the old British practice, necessary under the balance of power policy, of treating the defeated enemy as an equal, whose friendship may be important. Ironical, and symptomatic of the decay of British statecraft, is the fact that the British Labor Government at first sought to impose punitive restrictions on Japanese economic recovery, yielding only to Mr. Dulles' insistence on a more ethical settlement.

In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty makes us a military partner of ten governments, in addition to Canada. And the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has not merely formed its own military establishment. It has also organized permanent committees for the allocation and increased production of raw materials, with a special international Secretariat for that purpose established in Washington. This "International Materials Conference" is wholly outside U.N. and operates as the economic arm of the Atlantic alliance.

What is most remarkable about all this tremendous development is not the strength, but the absence, of popular opposition. The argument has not been over whether the United States should form an alliance with the European empires, which the Senate approved in 1949 by the overwhelming vote of 82 to 13. The debate has focussed on whether this decision implied all the results that have sprung from it, including virtual alliances with Spain, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, and on whether or not the Administration has taken the people sufficiently into its confidence in developing the alliance policy.

This relative absence of criticism is at least partially explained by the background of the Monroe Doctrine. That always implied close co-operation with Great Britain. In 1948, Britain, then gravely weakened, allied itself with the French, Dutch and Belgian empires. Rather than make an alliance with Britain alone the United States in effect enlarged this "Western Union" to provide an "integrated defense" for Western Europe and its remaining colonial dependencies. Spain was then aligned with the "Grand Alliance", in spite of strong British and French disapproval of this step.

There is no question that defense of the remaining colonial possessions of the European empires—in Africa and Asia as well as America—is an essential strategic concept of NATO, the North American Treaty Organization, which is already the nucleus of a miniature League of Nations, but in this case built on the concept of an international army.

Much as NATO can be traced back to the Monroe Doctrine, so the American decision to defend Formosa, taken without any U.N. indorsement, can be traced back to the Open Door. The same applies to the new and imperial Pacific treaties. Public opinion virtually forced this belated effort to save something of what the Yalta agreement had surrendered in the Far East.

If the Truman Administration was ahead of public opinion in forming NATO, it was no less behind public opinion in standing for an active policy in behalf of the Chinese Nationalists. Had the State Department been left to its own devices, apparently the Far East would have been completely abandoned to Communist domina-

tion. In this area, certainly, it was the opposition party that sponsored imperialistic action.

The area of unity in present American foreign policy is therefore much wider than appears at first glance. Criticism centers not so much on what the State Department has done or left undone, but rather on the evasive and extravagant manner in which policy has been developed. Indeed the strongest opposition attack has focussed not on the aggressiveness but rather on the pusillanimity of our foreign policy, in regard to Communist China.

7.

AT THE CLOSE of World War II there was a faint possibility that the United Nations would establish a new international equilibrium. But such political success for this organization was never probable. It was based on the assumption that two victorious allies with nothing in common—the United States and Russia—would somehow continue in an amicable partnership. Even without the complicating factor of revolutionary Communism this Utopian outcome would have been most unlikely. We have noted “the historic tendency of allies to fall out as soon as the external threat that prompted the alliance is removed”. It is that tendency which undermined U.N.

As this organization failed, at least in its larger objectives, there arose the possibility of a restoration of the

Balance of Power, under the traditional British leadership. This would have involved, *first* a real unification of Western Europe; *second* a disposition on the part of a European Federal Union to throw its weight either and alternatively towards Russia or the United States, in order to hold the scales of power even. That scrupulous impartiality, as has been pointed out, is of the essence of the Balance of Power policy.

It was not possible, in the first place, for Western Europe to form a federal union. With the various reasons for this we do not here concern ourselves. The fact itself is obvious.

Even with political unity it would be very difficult for Western Europe to hold a balance between the United States and Russia. The whole dynamic of Communism demands unquestioning adherence to its creed. The whole dynamic of the West demands resistance to that tyranny.

Lacking the will to unite, but possessing at least in some measure the will to oppose Communism, it was inevitable that Western Europe, with its remaining African and Asiatic dependencies, should turn to America, for support and leadership. It was not inevitable that the United States should accept this responsibility. But it has done so.

In this book an effort has been made to sketch the predisposing factors in the decision that has been taken. To predict the future is no part of a study that has endeavored to be scientific. Yet, in concluding, some generalities are less in the nature of anticipation than of summarizing what is already said.

8.

IF THERE IS full-scale war between the Western world and Russia, the latter will lose but Communism, in one form or another, will quite probably win. Athens was fatally corrupted in destroying Sparta; the fiber of Rome was weakened in destroying Carthage; Britain seems permanently degraded, in physical power, by the destruction of Germany. There is no reason to suppose that our American Republic would happily survive the military triumph it could expect to achieve, at ruinous cost, against the U.S.S.R.

And one cannot anticipate that the Republic will in any case be only superficially affected by the existing strains. All of its institutions—political, economic, religious, educational and cultural—demand a diffusion of power. Our present foreign policy implies the utmost concentration of power. As that policy works out all our domestic institutions will be under more and more pressure to adapt themselves to permanently centralized control.

In that connection we may reasonably recall the conclusion reached by the great English historian, Arnold Toynbee, after his exhaustive inquiry into the rise and fall of civilizations:

“Whatever the human faculty, or the sphere of its exercise, may be, the presumption that because a faculty has proved equal to the accomplishment of a limited task within its proper field it may therefore be counted upon to produce

some inordinate effect in a different set of circumstances is never anything but an intellectual and a moral aberration and never leads to anything but certain disaster.”⁹

To avoid this “certain disaster” it is a minimum essential for the American people to scrutinize every administrative proposal carefully, to debate its implications thoroughly; to demand that the sum total of commitments be strictly limited to what the strength of the Republic can unquestionably support. Already there are grave preliminary warnings that our ability, both literally and metaphorically, is overtaxed. Nor is this wholly the fault of the Administration, which was obviously disposed to cut its losses in Asia.

The general tendency of the Executive, however, will always be to arrogate more power to itself. In an emergency that tendency is amplified, and is indeed accepted by many people as desirable.

In the protracted emergency which we now confront the course is therefore charted towards dictatorship unless the people and their representatives demand prior proof of necessity for every step that centralizes power in the Administration. That elementary precaution does not of itself mean a lack of faith in foreign policy leadership. It means, rather, an affirmation of faith in fundamental American principles.

For all its surface aberrations, and mistakes of direction, the foreign policy of the United States has lately been wavering around a natural evolutionary line, at a pace quickened and stimulated by the Communist im-

⁹ Arnold J. Toynbee: *A Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press; 1939), Vol. IV, p. 504.

pact. That evolution could lead to the triumph of the principle of self-government everywhere; or it could lead to the extinction of that principle here at home. It was an ominous sign when it was argued that foreign policy should be taken out of politics. It is a healthy sign now that this vital subject has again become a matter of household concern and sharp Congressional debate.

For, as we have endeavored to show, there is fundamentally no more mystery in the theory of foreign policy than there is in that of the multiplication table. The American citizen is as competent to understand the one as the other. And the fewer the mysterious incantations, the more the factual town-hall discussion, the sharper the critical faculty in Congress and the press, the better the chances that American know-how will bring the Republic safely through the strain of the accelerated tempo under which we live and labor.

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A NOTE ON THE TYPE

This book was set on the Linotype in Janson, a recutting made direct from the type cast from matrices made by Anton Janson some time between 1660 and 1687. Janson's original matrices were, at last report, in the possession of the Stempel foundry, Frankfurt am Main.

Of Janson's origin nothing is known. He may have been a relative of Justus Janson, a printer of Danish birth who practiced in Leipzig from 1614 to 1635. Some time between 1657 and 1668 Anton Janson, a punch-cutter and type-founder, bought from the Leipzig printer Johann Erich Hahn the type-foundry that had formerly been a part of the printing house of M. Friedrich Lankisch. Janson's types were first shown in a specimen sheet issued at Leipzig about 1675. Janson's successor, and perhaps his son-in-law, Johann Karl Edling, issued a specimen sheet of Janson types in 1689. His heirs sold the Janson matrices in Holland to Wolfgang Dietrich Erhardt, of Leipzig.

Composed, printed, and bound by

H. WOLFF, NEW YORK




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